THE ARGUMENT FROM LOGIC FOR THE NONEXISTENCE OF GOD

by

Steven J. Conifer

Author's Note: The following essay is derived from the rough draft for a book entitled (tentatively) The Argument from Logic for the Nonexistence of God, which I have recently completed and begun to revise for publication. Although the treatment presented here is far less detailed than that contained in the book, I have attempted to retain its essential elements and provide the reader with an overview of the AL, the various theistic defenses thereto, and the objections to those defenses (each of which, I believe, is refuted by at least one of the objections). In addition, while the AL as presented in the book is applied to many different concepts of God, within this essay (chiefly for space considerations) it shall be applied only to the sort of deity who desires that humans believe in him (i.e., the sort in which most theists profess a belief).

1. Prefatory Comments

I shall herein propound an atheological argument which I have dubbed "the Argument from Logic" (to be abbreviated AL). The primary difference between AL and most other atheological arguments is that AL appeals not to a lack of action on God's part (e.g., his failure to provide good evidence for his existence, to prevent or reduce suffering, etc.), but rather to a particular feature of human beings for which theists must presume God is either directly or indirectly responsible. (The only possible exception to that assertion would be those theists who do not believe God to be omnipotent, a small minority whose view I shall address briefly toward the end of the essay). As AL attempts to show, said feature is incompatible with the sort of deity in which the vast majority of theists profess a belief[1] (i.e., one who desires that humans believe in him); of course, there are other concepts of a deity (or definitions of "God"), but they are far less common than the aforementioned sort and are beyond the scope of the present essay, which aims exclusively to prove beyond a reasonable doubt the nonexistence of the God in whom most claim to believe.

Let us now examine a precise formulation of AL.

2. The Argument from Logic (AL) Formulated

(A) If God (that is, a deity who desires that humans believe in him) were to exist, most humans would not possess any capacity, ability, or predisposition by virtue of which they could disprove (or at least doubt) his existence.

(B) Most humans possess the following:

(1) The capacity to reason, which has often led many to question God's existence, based primarily upon the fact that reason suggests that if God were to exist, there would probably be clear, objective evidence for his existence; that because nobody remembers anything prior to the start of his physical life, probably nobody experiences anything ensuing his physical death; that, therefore, it is likely that people's minds are merely an epiphenomenon of their brains; that because humans appear to have evolved from simpler organisms, they are merely the product of a natural evolution, rather than the special creation of a deity; and that if God's existence were apparent to humans, there would be far less confusion among theists regarding his nature and far fewer nontheists than actually exist.

(2) The ability to ascertain empirical data, analyze that data, and draw from it logical inferences, many of which indicate that only physical entities exist[2] and that supernatural beings and realms are purely fictitious; that, therefore, there exist no such places as heaven or hell; that laws of nature cannot be violated; that human beings are subject to, and governed by, said laws; that everything can be explained scientifically; that miracles do not actually occur; and that no deity was necessary for the creation (or existence) of the universe as we know it.

(3) A predisposition to skepticism in general, especially of positive assertions which seem to be grounded more on "wishful thinking" and popular superstitions than sound arguments, cogent analyses, and tangible proof; of claims which are difficult to verify or outright unfalsifiable, or which seem vague, incoherent, or even meaningless; and of virtually all propositions which lack good objective evidence, seem to contradict scientific principles, or simply appear far-fetched and undeserving of serious consideration.

(C) Most humans possess a capacity, ability, and predisposition by virtue of which they can disprove (or at least doubt) God's existence. [from B1, B2, & B3]

(D) Therefore, God does not exist. [from (A) & (C)]

3. Comments on AL

There are, of course, several objections which could be raised against premises (A) and (B). I shall label the first set "Challenges to Premise (A)" and the second "Challenges to Premise (B)." It should be noted that those in the first group represent theistic attempts to justify humans' possessing the capacity, ability, and predisposition explicated in premise (B), whereas those in the latter represent theistic attempts to refute that premise and thereby show premise (C) to be false.

Also, I should like to underscore the fact that AL, as it is being considered here, aims to refute the existence of any deity who desires that humans believe in him; all other attributes (with the possible exception of omnipotence, as was mentioned in "Prefatory Comments," above) are irrelevant. Some might challenge the semantic accuracy of implying that a desire- in this case God's desire for humans to believe in him- somehow constitutes an "attribute." This is something I am happy to grant, leaving for another occasion the linguistic difficulties that might arise from such phraseology. In any case, my point here is that on the basis of that desire alone, AL constitutes a strong evidential argument for the nonexistence of God so conceived.

With those remarks in mind, let us proceed.

4. Challenges to Premise (A)

As I see it, AL most clearly presents a problem for those theists who concede that humans possess the capacity, ability, and predisposition explicated in premise (B) but who believe that God has some justification for their being so endowed. As Pascal Bercker has queried, "[H]ow could... God allow for the evidence to support a position of nonbelief based on solid intellectual foundations....?"[3]

However, Bercker has, so far as I know, posed this question only in relation to the belief held by many evangelical Christians that God sends nonbelievers to hell, which Bercker (quite rightly) argues would be grossly unfair in light of the evidence to which he refers; apparently, he fails to appreciate the correlation between that evidence (and, more pertinent to the thrust of AL, the obvious consequence of that evidence, namely, nonbelief in God on the part of humans) and the very existence of a deity who desires that humans believe in him. In other words, rather than reason merely that no such deity could punish people for not believing in him, Bercker should go a step further and conclude that, given the relevant data, it is probable that no such deity even exists. Put simply, if God were to exist and indeed were to desire belief in his existence on the part of humans, what sense would it have made for him to do such a thing (i.e., endow them, or permit them to be endowed, with the capacity, ability, and predisposition explicated in premise [B])?

In the ensuing sections, I shall explore the matter in as much detail as space permits, examining four[4] theistic defenses against premise (A) and attempting (as thoroughly as possible) to show why each of them fails.

5.1. The Fairness Defense (FD)

The essence of this defense is that in order to make things "fair" (or "even"), it was necessary for God to afford humans (or permit them to possess) the capacity, ability, and predisposition explicated in premise (B) of AL. That is, in order to allow humans the freedom to make their own decisions regarding his existence, it was essential for God to "level the playing field" by endowing them (or pemitting them to be endowed) with the sort of intellectual capacities (i.e., the capacity to reason, analyze empirical data and draw from it logical inferences, etc.) contained in premise (B). Had he not, humans would be naturally disposed toward theistic belief, which would eliminate (or at least considerably diminish) the kind of freedom in question. (In this way, what I here refer to as the "Fairness Defense" somewhat resembles what has been called the "Free-will Defense," which states essentially that for God to in any way influence humans' beliefs or environment would necessarily interfere with their free will, which he desires more than their awareness of his existence.)

There could be raised against FD at least six substantial objections, each aiming to significantly weaken it so as to constitute, when combined with the others, a fatal blow thereto. The theist, I submit, must inevitably concede that appealing to "fairness" in order to reconcile God's existence with premise (C) of AL is fruitless.

Let us now take up those objections.

5.2. The Determinism Objection (to FD)

One of the fundamental assumptions upon which FD rests is that humans possess free will,[5] as is evidenced by its assertion that people have the freedom to "make their own decisions." However, that people actually possess free will is by no means established or uncontroversial. It is a matter which is frequently debated among both philosophers and scientists of various fields (particularly within quantum physics). To simply assume it to be true is question-begging.

Moreover, quite a strong case can be made for determinism, or at least "human-action determinism," also known as "near-determinism" (i.e., the theory that every human action and decision is completely causally determined by events and conditions of the past, leading back, eventually, to the remote past, including causes prior to the person's own birth).[6] For instance, indeterminism (i.e., the theory that not every human action and decision is completely causally determined by events and conditions of the past) postulates the occurrence of uncaused choices, ostensibly a sort which are entirely spontaneous and random and occur "out of the blue," by pure chance. But such an idea is incoherent; nobody can really grasp what it means. Indeed, it would seem to make nary a shred of sense to suggest that somebody performed a given action for no reason whatsoever. To be sure, we often, in ordinary language, use the word "random" to describe arbitrary or unexpected behavior (e.g., if a man were to suddenly begin screaming in public and subsequently attack someone with his shoe, it might later be said that he performed a completely "random" action), but all we typically mean by this is that such behavior appears random, that it has no apparent cause. We know, of course, that there exists some explanation for it, even if it is not readily ascertainable. To claim that no explanation could ever be discovered would be unjustifiably hasty, and almost certainly inaccurate.

In addition, the theory of indeterminism has been forcefully attacked by science for centuries. Few rational individuals would hesitate to grant that most theories so persuasively challenged by scientists (both at present and in the past) are probably false. Put another way, because indeterminism appears to be inconsistent with science, it follows that indeterminism is likely an incorrect theory. Of course, it does not follow from that that determinism is necessarily true, but it certainly lends strong support to such a hypothesis.

Furthermore, the goal of this objection is not to prove that determinism is true, but rather to show that free will is far from a given, which, of course, severely undermine's FD's background assumption that humans do, in fact, possess free will. Because that assumption is questionable, FD can be reasonably doubted.

5.3. The Divine-foreknowledge Objection (to FD)

This objection is analogous to the previous one in that it appeals to humans' lack of free will (or at least the possibility of their not having free will) in order to refute one of FD's key presuppositions. However, unlike the "Determinism Objection," the present one makes no references to scientific theories or anything of the like. Rather, it appeals directly to one of the properties commonly ascribed to God, that of "divine foreknowledge" (i.e., God's ability to foresee, or know in advance, everything which will happen or exist in the future, including humans' actions, thoughts, beliefs, etc.).

The question which naturally arises from that property in relation to FD should be obvious: how can human beings possibly have genuine freedom of volition if God possesses such an ability? If God knows everything that a person will do before he does it, it would be logically impossible for that person to perform any action contrary to God's foreknowledge. In other words, if God foresees that person X will perform action Y at time T, person X must perform action Y at time T. For example, if God knows that I am going to wear a particular shirt tomorrow, it would be impossible for me not to wear that shirt. Hence, I would not truly possess free will (i.e., the ability to choose among actions all of which are avoidable), which would make FD doubtful.

Of course, an advocate of FD could simply deny that God possesses foreknowledge. But such a claim would be inconsistent with another of FD's chief assumptions, namely, that God foresaw the need to endow humans (or permit them to be endowed) with the capacity, ability, and predisposition explicated in premise (B) of AL in order to allow them the freedom to make their own decisions regarding his existence, thereby making things "fair." At the very least, FD presupposes that God, at the time humans entered existence, possessed a substantial amount of knowledge concerning the beliefs they would form and the manner in which they would form those beliefs; that is, according to FD, God either foreknew or accurately predicted at least the following three occurrences: first, that most humans would come to postulate the existence of a deity; second, that they would be naturally disposed toward a belief in such a deity; and third, that by endowing them with the capacity, ability, and predisposition explicated in premise (B) of AL, he would be able to offset that inherent leaning and "level the playing field." (One might argue here that since God designed and created humans, it would not have been particularly difficult for him to predict such occurrences, but such an idea seems totally incompatible with FD's central theme: that God gave humans unrestricted free will because he wanted them to think and behave however they desired; that is, if God truly wanted all humans to be free, it would have been conspicuously inconsistent for him to have designed them in such a way as to inhibit that freedom by imposing upon them certain intrinsic inclinations.)

Is it possible that God could have predicted even those three occurrences were he not in possession of foreknowledge? Although most would doubtless concede that it is at least conceivable that he could have done so (i.e., that he could have speculated based on the available data that those things would happen), surely few would contend that it is likely. Therefore, FD probably requires that God possess foreknowledge, and so probably it cannot consistently presuppose also that humans have free will. Hence, FD can be reasonably doubted.

5.4. The Scriptural Objection (to FD)

This objection has relevance only for Christians, particularly those who believe the Bible to be the inerrant word of God and free of any errors or defects. All other readers are urged to skip this objection and move on to the next one.

FD rests on the assumption that God wants humans to come to believe in him of their own accord, without any interference by God himself. However, numerous biblical passages seem to contradict this view.[7] For instance, in the Book of Exodus, God performed spectacular miracles before the Israelites and the Egyptians in order to prove to them his supreme power and authority. According to Exodus 7:5, "the Egyptians will know that I am the Lord when I stretch out my hand against Egypt and bring the Israelites out of it." And Exodus 10:1-2 states the following:

Then the Lord said to Moses, "Go to Pharaoh, for I have hardended his heart and the hearts of his officials so that I may perform these miraculous signs of mine among them, that you may tell your children and grandchildren how I dealt harshly with the Egyptians and how I performed my signs among them, and that you may know that I am the Lord."

Several verses expressing a similar theme could be cited.[8]

In addition, God proved things to Gideon by way of astonishing miracles. For example, he made fire come out of a rock (Judg. 6:21). Subsequently, in order to meet Gideon's own challenge, God proceeded first to place dew overnight only on some fleece and nothing else and then the next night he placed dew on everything else but the fleece (Judg. 6:37-40). God also revealed himself to Samson's parents by performing a miracle for them (Judg. 13:19-23). And he further demonstrated his divine nature to the hundreds of people assembled on Mount Carmel by means of another amazing miracle (1 Kings 18:1-39). In the New Testament, Jesus employed miracles so as to persuade people to adopt certain beliefs.[9] He also miraculously appeared before a skeptical Thomas (John 20:24-28), and bestowed upon the Apostles the capacity to perform an abundance of miracles (sometimes even resurrections) in order to convert people to the new religion. Acts 14:3, for example, contains the following passage: "Paul and Barnabas spent considerable time there, speaking boldly for the Lord, who confirmed the message of his grace by enabling them to do miraculous signs and wonders."[10] Paul himself came to acquire new beliefs as the consequence of a miraculous occurrence on the road to Damascus.

In light of these passages from Scripture, it seems that either there is no real conflict between the observers' free will and God causing beliefs in the given way, or else God is no more concerned about the interference with free will than he is with people's nonbelief. In either case, FD's assertion that God fails to reveal himself to humans because to do so would be unfair (i.e., it would eliminate or at least greatly diminish their free will) is erroneous. Not only does the Bible in no way refer to God's desire to make things "fair" or "even" by endowing humans with the capacity, ability, and predisposition explicated in premise (B) of AL, it seems to strongly suggest just the opposite: that God desires belief in his existence on the part of humans to such a great extent that he is (or at least was) willing to directly cause such belief by both performing miracles himself and enabling select individuals ("the chosen few," it might be said) to do the same. Hence, FD (at least within the context of Christianity) clearly stands refuted.

5.5. The Irrationality Objection (to FD)

Advocates of FD would surely have to maintain that if God were to provide any sort of sign that he exists, people would no longer have a real choice in the matter of whether or not to believe in him. In that way, then, FD seems to presuppose that since God is unwilling to supply everyone with good evidence for his existence, he wants at least some people to come to believe in him without good evidence (and in spite of the capacity, ability, and predisposition explicated in premise [B]). But would God really want such a thing? If so, why? Most would probably agree that for people to believe anything without good evidence is irrational, especially when there exists considerable evidence which contradicts that belief. And for those who claim that God wishes for people to believe in him based strictly on "faith," the question ought to be put to them: Why? Why would God create us in such a way that our natural tendency is to believe only those propositions for which there exists good objective evidence, yet desire that we make a significant exception in the case of "God exists"? Put another way, why should we believe in God on the basis of faith but not believe in anything else on that basis? What good reason is there to have faith in God, but not have faith in, say, the Loch Ness Monster, or Big Foot, or unicorns? As drastically misguided as such comparisons might initially seem, there is no real difference between the two kinds of entities being considered: the former is supposed to be some sort of nonphysical being which mysteriously created the universe and now hides from its inhabitants, and the latter a group of mythical creatures that conceals itself from humanity with all the thoroughness of an invisible deity.

There is, in fact, no better evidence for the existence of God than there is for any of those mythical creatures (the only substantial difference being that humans generally want to believe in God, presumably because they find such a belief comforting, pleasing, and perhaps somehow proper, whereas a belief in the Loch Ness Monster or Big Foot yields no such psychological benefits). Therefore, it is just as irrational (at least epistemically) to believe in God as it would be to believe in the types of creatures described above; no good evidence exists for either. [11] Hence, if FD is correct, God must want at least some humans to come to believe in him on an irrational basis, a contention which seems highly unlikely and with which I imagine most advocates of FD would themselves vehemently disagree. Thus, FD appears to be unsound.

5.6. The Desirability-of-Truth Objection (to FD)

It would be fair to say, I think, that human beings generally want to know the truth. We frequently exhibit this desire in our everyday lives: we read informative books to gain knowledge of our world; we attend educational classes and seminars to learn the facts of various subjects; and on a more personal level, we ordinarily expect our spouses, family members, and friends to be honest with us, particularly in matters of great consequence. This appreciation for truth seems an inherent and universal characteristic of our species, much like our desire for acceptance, or affection, or comfort. Moreover, we want to know the truth not only because it satisfies that innate desire, but because it serves a number of essential practical functions as well: when we know the truth, problems are far easier to solve, obstacles can be more readily overcome, and harmony is much easier to achieve. Virtually everyone should agree, then, that discovering and understanding the truth is both prudentially and epistemically desirable.

Further, we do not typically complain that our free will has been interfered with when we are taught a new fact or shown something of which we were previously unaware. It would seem quite peculiar indeed if someone were to object to being shown or taught something (that might conflict with one of his existing ideas, beliefs, or assumptions) on the basis that it somehow hinders his ability to "make his own decisions." For instance, suppose there exists a rather unenlightened fellow who has always believed that the earth is actually flat rather than spherical. Upon being told that the earth really is spherical (and being presented with good objective evidence for that), the fellow becomes angry and protests his having been informed of the fact in question on the grounds that his free will has been interfered with. "I do not appreciate this new knowledge," the man might grumble. "Now I have no choice but to abandon my false belief and accept that the world is, in fact, spherical in shape. I no longer have the freedom to believe what I used to, what I liked believing. Therefore, my free will has been violated; I have been forced to know the truth."

Does that really sound like a plausible scenario? Does the fellow's argument have any force or validity? I strongly suspect that most, like I, would answer "no" to both questions, and that most would regard the situation described above as positively strange, if not downright ridiculous. If the sort of reasoning such a fellow embraces were to be taken seriously and adopted by the masses, it would become exceedingly difficult to justify the existence of schools, encyclopedias, newspapers, and anything else of a comparably informative nature.

Obviously, few would advocate the abolition of any of those. In fact, nearly everyone is of the opinion that learning new facts and gaining new knowledge is beneficial, even indispensable to a productive and succesful life. Many even dedicate their entire lives to the pursuit of knowledge and imparting to others what they have learned. Thus, there can be no doubt that humans, by and large, place an enormous value on education and the acquisition of knowledge. Even when acquiring it necessitates that one modify his beliefs and convictions, almost everyone views the process as favorable and proper. So how, then, could it ever constitute (as the fellow in the above example asserts) a violation of one's free will? As Theodore M. Drange writes:

Why should causing true beliefs in people by, say, showing them things, interfere with their free will? On the contrary, people want to know the truth. It would seem, then, that to show them things and thereby cause them to have knowledge, would not interfere with their free will, but would conform to it. Most people realize that knowldge makes a person more, not less free. (Jesus himself, according to John 8:32 [of the Revised Standard Version of the Bible], said, "the truth will make you free.") Even the performance of spectacular miracles, leading to knowledge or awareness, need not interfere with free will. Since people want to know the truth and how the world is ultimately set up (especially insofar as it affects them), for God to perform miracles before them would only conform to that desire and would thereby not interfere with their free will. (Original italics) [12]

Still, one might object to this line of thought by pointing out that knowledge of the truth, though certainly in many ways beneficial and desirable, can often be so psychologically distressing as to outweigh the advantages it normally carries with it. An example of such a case might be a patient who is terminally ill, and whose doctor is unsure as to whether or not he ought to apprise this patient of his circumstances. The doctor wrestles with the decision, torn between being honest and sparing the patient of tremendous worry and despair. On one hand, informing the patient of his condition would allow him time to put his affairs in order and complete any important tasks which require his attention. On the other hand, telling him the truth might dishearten him so greatly as to ruin what little time he has remaining.

Indeed, the doctor appears to be in quite a dilemma; there seems no clear way to determine what course of action is best in such a situation. However, the analogy fails miserably, and the reason should be evident: the disparity between the doctor's predicament and the situation in which we are here assuming God finds himself is indisputably vast. The doctor, by notifying the patient of his condition, would be conveying bad news (perhaps even the worst sort imaginable), whereas God, by making his existence known to humanity, would be conveying good news[13], if not unsurpassably wonderful news. (Incidentally, that very idea is conveyed by many Christians' reference to the gospel message as "good news.") By revealing himself to mankind, God would be providing all of humanity with unparalelled hope and joy, a clear and gratifying purpose for living. Surely even nontheists who were already perfectly content would be delighted to learn that God is real, even if it required that they adjust their worldview so as to render it compatible with their new awareness. This would be particularly likely if it were also revealed that eternal bliss awaits everyone in the hereafter, wherein each shall be reunited with his deceased loved ones and receive ample compensation for his earthly suffering (assuming such a concept is even intelligible).

But suppose God is of the sort in which most evangelical Christians believe, the kind of deity who admits only a certain group (or groups) of humans into heaven and damns the rest to hell for eternity. Certainly that kind of knowledge would not please everyone (or even a majority of people), considering that Christians at present comprise only a third of the world's population.[14] But the difficulty here is a superficial one. Because the deity in which even evangelical Christians (most of whom subscribe to the doctrine of exclusivism) profess a belief supposedly wants all humans to be saved (damning nonbelievers to hell only because of their failure to accept Christ as their Lord and Savior), he must also want all humans to be aware of his existence, so it would be perfectly consistent for him to enlighten them by means of miracles or some other such device.

This brings us to a different kind of response to the "Desirability-of-truth Objection," one I shall call the "Feigned-allegiance Reply." This reply suggests, essentially, that if God were to reveal himself too clearly to humans, their obedience to him would become unduly prudent or rational, that their allegiance to him would become too easy and self-serving. Put another way, if God were to make his presence known to humanity, people would be greatly tempted to "do the right thing" simply to please God, rather than as the result of more commendable and altruistic motivations. This might also be dubbed the "Sleeping-policeman Reply," because it portrays God as a sort of furtive law enforcer who apprehends suspects by allowing them to commit crimes (unknowingly) in his presence. (Presumably, within the framework of this analogy, those who transgress God's law are "apprehended" in the afterlife, where they are justly punished for their misdeeds.)

I find this response terribly misguided. First of all, theists comprise well over half of the world's population, and the vast majority of them subscribe to some kind of objective morality dependent upon God which, if violated, occasions significant and adverse consequences for the violator. Therefore, at least half of the human beings alive today are already susceptible to the temptation described above (i.e., to behave in the way they believe God desires more out of self-interest than any sort of genuine altruism).

Second, assuming that God is omniscient (as nearly all theists do), it would be ludicrous to suppose that those apt to obey his will merely for selfish reasons could somehow dupe him into thinking their obedience sincere. Obviously, it would require little effort on his part to distinguish the "real" do-gooders from the "phony" do-gooders; no feigned philanthropy could possibly escape the notice of an all-knowing deity.

Third, it would seem only fair for God to explicitly convey what is moral and immoral, what constitutes a trangression of his law and what is acceptable. Or, if not explicitly convey that information, at least provide some rough guidelines as to what he expects from us; how else can we possibly know how to conduct ourselves? There are currently circulating among theists seemingly countless ideas about just what constitutes God's "infallible law," many of them quite confusing or incoherent and some even self-contradictory. To be sure, most of the major religious views (i.e., those of the various Christian, Jewish, and Islamic denominations) appear to conflict in one way or another, which serves only to exacerbate the ambiguity and controversy surrounding the issue of God's "code of ethics" (as it might be called). Thus, it would seem quite expedient for God to somehow clarify these matters and thereby assist people in understanding (at least to some extent) what is required of them.

Fourth, and perhaps most substantial, no part of the "Desirability-of-truth Objection" is at all relevant to the kind of deportment God wishes for humans to display. Nowhere does the objection call for God to reveal his preferences regarding humans' behavior. Although, as was just shown, it would greatly improve our ability to act properly (i.e., in accordance with God's desires), it is by no means necessary that God provide such information in order to simply reveal his existence to humanity, a move which the "Desirability-of-truth Objection" argues would in no way interfere with humans' free will (which, according to FD, would be unfair).

Yet another response to the "Desirability-of-truth Objection" is one which might be labeled the "Epistemic-distance Reply." One writer who seems to advocate this line of thought is John Hick, who says the following:

In order to be fully personal and therefore morally free beings, [humans] have... been created at a distance from God- not a spatial but an epistemic distance, a distance in the dimension of knowledge. They are formed within and as part of an autonomous universe within which God is not overwhelmingly evident but in which God may become known by the free interpretative response of faith. [15]

What Hick may be intimating here (among other things) is that, quite apart from the fact that humans naturally want to know the truth, for God to reveal himself to them would in a way overwhelm their consciousness, as his is a nature so complex and awesome as to preclude comprehension on the part of humans. Thus, it is not that God is unwilling to make himself known to humanity, but rather that he cannot do so.

As with the other replies to the "Desirability-of-truth Objection," Hick's (and others of a similar ilk) can be quite easily rebutted, particularly within the context of Christianity. As was demonstrated in the "Scriptural Objection," God at one time frequently employed spectacular miracles so as to reveal his existence and cause certain beliefs in people. That theme is especially prevalent in the Old Testament, according to which God diligently endeavored to make the Israelites aware of him as their Lord. He performed a series of miracles as he led them out of Egypt, aiding their efforts to survive in the wilderness,[16] and subsequently assisting them in battle. And yet, all of God's astonishing feats notwithstanding, not only were the Israelites less than "overwhelmed," but they deserted him soon thereafter and began worshipping other gods. Others who were less than stupefied by such supernatural events were those dwelling in the cities of Korazin, Bethsaida, and Capernaum for whom Jesus performed miracles (Matt. 11:20-23); John 12:37 describes a similar incident. And in Luke 16:31, the assertion is put forth that a man could return from the dead to tell people about the afterlife and perhaps still encounter only skepticism and distrust.

In view of all this, it seems clear that Hick is way off the mark by suggesting that God's revealing himself to humans would necessarily cause them to be "overwhelmed." Hick apparently fails to realize the extent of some people's obstinacy. Quite contrary to what he maintains, for God to demonstrate his existence, even by means of spectacular miracles, would far from "overwhelm" them, at least insofar as the Bible is concerned. That alone is sufficient reason for Christians (who believe the Bible to accurately depict the manner in which God thinks and operates) to reject the "Epistemic-distance Reply."

As for theists in general, they would fare only slightly better in pursuing the given reply. First of all, it almost certainly presupposes a strong form of voluntarism (i.e., the theory that beliefs are often directly subject to the will, or that people often choose their beliefs), which is a highly dubious view. I shall not analyze this matter in detail because I do not wish to formulate any of the objections to FD on the basis of involuntarism; nonetheless, it is certainly a relevant and significant challenge to the "Epistemic-distance Reply" which would deserve serious consideration if the reply in question were pressed.

Furthermore, it would hardly seem plausible to contend that God is incapable of revealing his existence without "overwhelming" humans (especially since we are, for the time being, assuming him to be omnipotent). Not even spectacular miracles of the sort described above would be necessary to accomplish the task. He could simply enable missionaries (or even just a select group of individuals) to present their case for theism so convincingly that everyone (or very nearly everyone) would eventually come to believe in him. Or perhaps he could reveal himself in something of a piecemeal fashion (so as to prevent "overwhelming" people with a single astonishing miracle), at first providing only extremely subtle evidence for his existence and gradually supplementing it until it became so clear to humanity that virtually no one would deny it. Surely any deity worth his salt could manage to devise some process by which to make himself known without paralyzing people's senses. Hence, the "Epistemic-distance Reply" appears to be a failure.

One last response to the "Desirability-of-truth Objection" is simply an appeal to the kind of stubbornness mentioned in connection with the "Epistemic-distance Reply." This response might be called the "Futility Reply." It is basically the argument that even if God were to reveal himself to humans (particularly nontheists), they could nonetheless refuse to believe in him through some sort of self-deception or "denial." That is, they could irrationally deny his existence no matter how obvious God rendered it, and therefore even attempting to make himself known to humans would be futile.

The most substantial problem with this idea is that it imposes a restriction upon a being whom most believe is omnipotent (as we have thus far assumed him to be). Clearly, to suggest that an all-powerful deity has no means at his disposal by which to eliminate nonbelief on the part of humans would be exceedingly difficult to defend; how could such a being not succeed in convincing people of his existence? It seems perfectly reasonable to conjecture that people would be strongly inclined to believe in him if he simply provided them with adequate proof. Few rational nontheists, I imagine, would cling to their skepticism if God were to make his existence known through clear, objective evidence. So the suggestion that God's revealing himself to humanity would likely be futile seems totally erroneous.

In any case, what is important to remember here is that AL is not an argument which stems from God's failure to provide adequate evidence for his existence. Rather, it appeals simply to the idea that humans' being endowed with the capacity, ability, and predisposition explicated in premise (B) is incompatible with the existence of a deity who desires that humans believe in him. So even if it could be shown that such a deity may have some justification for his failure to clearly reveal himself to humans, that would in no way explain humans' being so endowed. In other words, not even a strong argument against the "Desirability-of-truth Objection" would cast doubt over the truth of AL's premise (A). In order to create such doubt, one would have to be present some legitimate reason to believe that God not only desires to refrain from clearly revealing himself, but that he has some compelling motivation for having endowed humans (or permitted them to be endowed) with the capacity, ability, and predisposition explicated in premise (B). Therefore, if the "Desirability-of-truth Objection" is itself successful, it seems undeniable that FD is a lost cause.

5.7. The Optimum-World Objection (to FD)

In order to formulate this objection as clearly as possible, I should like to divide it into two parts, the first directed at FD's claim that God, by endowing humans (or permitting them to be endowed) with the capacity, ability, and predisposition explicated in premise (B), somehow made things "fair" in the realm of belief formation with regard to his existence; the second pertains to two hypothetical worlds both of which, as I shall attempt to show, would be far more conducive to optimizing humans' ability to "freely" form beliefs with respect to God's existence than is the actual one (contrary to FD's implicit claim that it is ideally suited for such belief formation).

Part I: FD explicitly states that God endowed humans (or permitted them to be endowed) with the capacity, ability, and predisposition explicated in premise (B) of AL in order to make things "fair" (or "level the playing field"), which presumably implies an attempt on God's part to balance the evidence and/or information available to humans regarding his existence, or at least to optimize their freedom to decide for themselves whether or not he exists and, assuming he does, what his nature might be.

However, it seems very doubtful that the evidence and/or information is actually balanced. All of the traditional arguments for God's existence (i.e., Cosmological, Teleological, Ontological, the Argument from Morality, the Argument from Miracles, etc.) have been amply refuted. As George H. Smith has noted, "Most philosophers and theologians now concede that belief in a god must rest on faith, not on reason."[17]

Conversely, many atheological arguments, such as the Argument from Evil, Theodore M. Drange's Arguments from Nonbelief and Confusion, the Incompatible-Properties Arguments, and the Lack-of-Evidence Argument (which is itself an attempt to show that there exists no good evidence for God's existence) have never, to my knowledge, been seriously challenged. In addition, assuming that premise (B) of AL is true, it is quite clear that there are far more reasons to doubt God's existence than defend it. Also, along with being entirely unverifiable, it seems likely that so-called private "religious experiences" (or virtually any other subjective basis for theistic belief) could be explained naturalistically (e.g., hallucinations, emotional stress, the consumption of mind-altering drugs, etc.).

Some might object to those claims on the grounds that they are more a matter of opinion than fact, that although I (and other like-minded individuals) may believe atheological arguments to be much stronger than the aforementioned theistic arguments and that private religious experiences can be explained naturalistically, that in no way makes those statements factual. They might contend that I have somehow misconstrued the available evidence and/or information regarding God's existence (whether unintentionally or deliberately, perhaps so as to accomodate some belief or desire of my own), and that such evidence and/or information really is perfectly balanced, or at least very close to it.

To such people I would reply that they are simply mistaken, perhaps because they have been misled in some way or because they fail to reason well; the truth of the matter is that there exists an extremely important distinction between the assertions put forth above and the contention that those assertions are, or probably are, inaccurate: the former are based on objective truths, whereas the latter is merely a misguided view. That is, according to any reasonable criteria, atheological arguments are generally much more cogent (i.e., more philosophically sound and more likely to correspond with reality) than are theistic arguments: there is far more evidential support for them, they typically contain more readily verifiable claims, and so forth. It is because of that fact that so many philosophers embrace atheism: the converse is entirely without merit. As George Smith has succinctly explained the matter: "Quite simply... belief in a god is unreasonable."[18]

Likewise, it is a fact that most alleged religious experiences could be explained naturalistically, and it is probable that they could all be so explained; people who claim to have had such experiences themselves frequently admit later that they were probably wrong in thinking those experiences genuine, and sometimes even discover precisely what induced them. Many of them who retain their theism will readily grant that they base it strictly on "faith." And for those who maintain that their experiences were genuine (i.e., that they have actually in some way experienced God or something supernatural), that would have no relevance for anyone else, for it could not be assessed or analyzed in the way that theistic arguments in the public arena can be. If someone asserts that he has "directly felt God's presence" (or something analogous thereto), that does nothing to support God's existence or render theism more plausible. Such claims are totally unfalsifiable and therefore meaningless; they are no more beneficial to a discussion of whether or not God exists than would be a statement such as, "Only need meat if the fence smokes olives," or "Fred Flinstone on the head of rabbits cooked at Stone Henge." Obviously, proclamations to that effect are neither in principle empirically verifiable nor analytic, and as such prove immune to meaningful discourse.

Theodore M. Drange, addressing the subject of what is sometimes called the "mumbo-jumbo" theory of some forms of religious language, says the following:

If a sentence is unintelligible, then either it does not express any proposition at all or else it expresses a proposition that is inconsistent or in some other way unthinkable. Therefore, it does not express anyone's belief. If people go around saying, 'I believe there is a personal being who is outside space and time,' then my reaction is to deny that they really believe that. Rather, such people are apparently mistaken about their own beliefs. To have a belief requires more than just the disposition to assert... given sentences. It is also required that there be some thinkable set of ideas to serve as the object of the belief. But if a sentence is unintelligible, then it does not express any such set of ideas. It cannot express anything which anyone could entertain in thought and which could thereby be the object of a belief. (Original italics) [19]

The question might again be raised why faith alone cannot constitute an adequate justification for believing in God. ("Don't feelings count for anything?" a person might ask. "Doesn't the fact that I feel God exists justify my belief in him?") The answer to that question depends on the manner in which the word "justification" is defined. If by "justification" one means simply "any reason put forward for something," then certainly faith on its own would be sufficient to justify theistic belief. By the same token, then, one could justify his belief in elves by saying, "I find the notion of elves to be very pleasant and enjoy films in which little actors portray elves; therefore, I believe in the existence of elves." Of course, that is a completely irrational justification for a belief in elves, but according to the given definition, it would suffice to justify such a belief.

However, if the word were taken in a sense which refers only to rational justifications (as I believe it is usually taken), then faith would in no way justify a belief in God, or anything else supernatural. As was mentioned in the "Irrationality Objection," there is no better reason to believe in God based on faith than there is to believe in any other mythical creature on such grounds. Any rational person would dismiss out of hand the idea of believing in fairies or leprechauns simply on the basis of faith, and he should do no differently in the case of God. In the fact, the very concept of faith is in sharp opposition to a rational mindset, rendering impossible a reasonable approach to anything. For the individual who desires sound beliefs and a view of reality unmarred by warped perceptions and faulty logic, faith poses a serious threat indeed. Writes George H. Smith on the perils of blind acceptance:

[To] believe on faith is to defy and abandon the judgment of one's mind. Faith conflicts with reason. It cannot give you knowledge; it can merely delude you into believing that you know more than you really do. Faith is intellectually dishonest, and should be rejected by every person of integrity. [20]

It should be clear by now that there are much better reasons to deny God's existence (or at least suspend judgment on the matter) than to subscribe to it. From an objective standpoint, no theistic argument is any good; even a believer of the most zealous lot would be reluctant to endorse any of them (assuming he is fair and rational in his assessments). And with regard to subjective reasons for believing God, the above comments should render it quite evident that such reasons are either immune to a meaningful analysis or simply irrational (or both). Coupled with the force of most atheological arguments, then, there should be little doubt that the evidence and/or information regarding God's existence is, at the very least, substantially unbalanced, with rational justifications for atheism (or agnosticism) far outweighing such justifications for theism.

Part II: As indicated at the beginning of the preceding segment (Part I), in this second half of the "Optimum-world Objection" I shall propose two hypothetical worlds (or situations), both of which, I think, would be far better suited to God's putative desire to balance the evidence and/or information regarding his existence, thereby optimizing people's ability to "freely" form their beliefs in relation thereto.

The first is a world in which there exists a clear and uncontroversial balance of evidence and/or information for and against God's existence. The evidence and/or information for both sides is exactly proportional, or at least so close to being exactly proportional as to prevent any appreciable disparity. It is almost universally accepted that the evidence and/or information in question is so balanced. Virtually everyone agrees that there is just as much evidence and/or information that implies God's existence as there is evidence and/or information that implies the contrary. It is widely held by both philosophers and the general public that there exist good objective reasons for both theism and atheism, and that those reasons are so evenly matched that neither view is more tenable than the other.. Noncongnitivists[21] are a nonexistent breed; practically everyone understands the given proposition and regards it as meaningful, but the data relevant thereto renders theism and atheism equally tenable beliefs. In short, the "playing field" of belief formation regarding God's existence is perfectly level.

The second is a world in which there clearly and uncontroversially exists no evidence and/or information whatsoever regarding God's existence. It is widely held by both philosophers and the general public that there are no good objective reasons to either accept or deny the proposition "God exists." Noncognitivists are a nonexistent breed; practically everyone understands the given proposition and regards it as meaningful, but there is simply no data relevant thereto (i.e., there is zero data to support theism or atheism). There exists absolutely no evidence and/or information on which to base theistic or atheological arguments. (None of the arguments referred to in this essay even exist.) In short, the very absence of relevant data necessarily renders the "playing field" level.

It should be noted that in neither of the hypothetical worlds (or situations) just described is there any call for God to interfere with anyone's free will. No spectacular miracles would be performed. No angels would be sent to earth to convey the news of God's existence. No beliefs would be directly implanted in people's brains by God or any other supernatural being(s). In both scenarios, humans would retain just as much free will as advocates of FD presume they actually have. There would simply be either a perfect balance of evidence and/or information regarding God's existence (as in the first world) or a total lack thereof (as in the second world); both, I submit, would offer a greater and more equitable opportunity for people to "freely" believe in God than does the actual one (i.e., the one in which we live). Both, in other words, would do a much better job of creating the level "playing field" to which FD refers.

Therefore, if FD were a correct view, it would be reasonable to think that God, defined as being who desires belief in his existence on the part of humans, would have caused one of the two hypothetical worlds (or situations) to obtain. But, as was shown earlier, it is not the case that either of those worlds (or situations) has obtained; atheism is a far more tenable belief than is theism. (At the very least, it is far from universally accepted that the evidence and/or information regarding God's existence is perfectly balanced or totally nonexistent; the fact that debates on that very topic occur as frequently as they do makes that abundantly clear.) Hence, FD must be an incorrect view.

6.1. The Testing Defense (TD)

The basic idea behind this defense is that God, although he desires belief in his existence on the part of humans, is testing them to separate those who believe in him despite the capacity, ability, and predisposition explicated in premise (B) of AL from those who fail to believe in him (presumably because of the given capacity, etc.). Theodore M. Drange discusses a similar defense by the same name in his Nonbelief & Evil (pp. 156-170), insofar as its applicability to the God of evangelical Christianity. Although the deity being considered here is restricted only by the aforementioned desire (i.e., that humans believe in him), some of the issues therein addressed shall be relevant to the present topic.

Let us now examine four objections to the defense.

6.2. The Unpopular-view Objection (to TD)

This objection is a refreshingly simple one: that God is testing people in their earthly lives to see who comes to believe in him despite the imbalance of evidence regarding his existence is not a view which seems at all popular among philosophers or theologians.[22] So far as I know, no one in the literature has ever seriously advocated this or any analogous defense against an atheological argument which alludes in some way to either said imbalance or, as in the case of AL, the very fact that humans are endowed with the capacity, ability, and predisposition explicated in premise (B). While this certainly does not in and of itself serve to refute TD, it nevertheless casts a decidedly inauspicious shadow over such an approach. That the defense is as deeply flawed as should be expected is precisely what I intend to show in the ensuing three objections.

6.3. The Divine-foreknowledge Objection (to TD)

The issue of God's supposed foreknowledge (or omniscience) can be raised against TD just as it was against FD; that is, if God is supposed to know everything that will ever exist or occur, what could possibly be the purpose of his testing people to see who comes to believe in him despite the given capacity, ability, and predisposition? Obviously, assuming that God indeed possesses foreknowledge, he must know the outcome of these "tests" before they are even conducted, so why would he bother with them at all?

As indubitably cogent as this objection appears to be, Theodore M. Drange regards it as inadequate, saying:

[W]e can think of possible reasons why God might have tests performed on people even though he already knows beforehand the outcome of the tests. In the case of Job, God wanted to prove to Satan that Job would pass the sort of test that Satan thought he would fail (see Job 1:8-22, 2:3-10). It could be like that with people generally. Maybe angels or saints are watching and God wants them to become enlightened about human nature, just as Satan became enlightened about Job. Or maybe God wants people who are being tested to become enlightened about themselves. For example, perhaps they are being tested so that they may come to know about their own sinful nature. On the basis of such possibilities, the given objection can be dismissed. [23]

I think Drange is mistaken here. First of all, I would say that most theists who believe God to be omniscient also think of Satan (assuming they believe in such a being at all) as possessing that property. The claim is often made by Christians that Satan is aware that he shall ultimately lose his "battle" with God, but continues to tempt people into committing acts of evil merely because he wants to cause as much suffering as he can (i.e., he wants to ensure that as many people get damned as possible). But how could Satan know that he will eventually be defeated if he lacks foreknowledge? Did God provide him with this information, and if so, why? If God has always known that Satan would engender as much misery as is within his power to bring about, what good would it have done to apprise him of his impending failure? From a Christian standpoint, then (despite the verses pertaining to Job, which seem to imply that Satan does lack foreknowledge), there is good reason to believe that Satan must possess omniscience, especially when he is viewed as being nearly equal to God in his abilities (or attributes) but not quite powerful enough to oust him.

Second, quite apart from scriptural considerations, if God is supposed to be omnipotent (as we are, for the moment, assuming him to be), it would be rather suspect to contend that he has at his disposal no means by which to enlighten "angels or saints" about human nature other than the tests in question. Could he not (by way of, say, divine will) simply furnish them with the knowledge necessary to comprehend how humans think and operate, thereby eliminating whatever function these so-called tests are designed to serve? And with regard to enlightening humans about their own sinful nature, how exactly is such an endeavor supposed to work? At what point are such people supposed to come to grasp their "sinfulness," and what are they then supposed to do about it? If the goal is to induce them to repent, it would doubtless be in God's interest to make them aware of what it is they are supposed to be repenting for. Most nontheists probably adhere to their nonbelief (or disbelief) for the entire duration of their lives, so it could hardly be said that the sort of tests described above often aid such people in coming to realize their own ignorance (regarding God's existence) and consequently atoning for it.

Another difficulty with this line of thought is that it presupposes doxastic voluntarism (i.e., the theory that people at least sometimes choose their beliefs and are therefore sometimes culpable for them) insofar as it assumes that beliefs themselves can be "sinful" (obviously, to claim that believing something is "sinful" would make sense only if beliefs were somehow subject to the will). While I shall not pursue this issue here, it is certainly relevant and would constitute a significant challenge to anyone who elected to embrace the type of reply suggested by Drange. (In fairness, Drange is himself skeptical of strong voluntarism,[24] so it is likely that he simply overlooked the given implication of such a position instead of actually assuming it to be correct.)

Thus, it has not been shown that the "Divine-foreknowledge Objection" applied to TD (or any analogous defense) is untenable, and it therefore remains a formidable obstacle for any advocate of TD who asserts God's omniscience.

6.4. The Inequity Objection (to TD)

In order to briefly expound this objection, I shall cite a passage from Theodore M. Drange's Nonbelief & Evil which succinctly illustrates the point:

If there were any test going on of the sort described within [TD], it would be very unfair to non-Christians. Quite apart from the issue of whether or not they are fools, non-Christians have powerful inducements to stick with the religion or belief-system of the family into which they happened to be born. It would be unfair to punish those with the "wrong" religion for not rebelling against their family and culture and switching to Christianity. To suggest that God is engaged in such a practice runs contrary to his being loving and just....[25]

Similarly, it would constitute a flagrant injustice on the part of God to punish (or exclude from any benefit[s] which theists receive) those who happened to be born into nontheistic families, individuals who are obviously more inclined to dismiss theism than accept it (i.e., succumb to the capacity, ability, and predisposition explicated in premise [B] of AL rather than resist them). In addition, millions of humans die at too young an age or are too mentally ill to be tested in the way TD suggests; their belief in God (or lack thereof) could not be meaningfully or accurately assessed. Clearly, then, the world in which we live is far from being ideally suited for such a test, rendering its feasibility extremely doubtful. For these reasons alone, TD ought to be rejected.

6.5. The Degree Objection (to TD)

Another major problem which arises in relation to TD is the extent to which one must believe in God (despite the capacity, ability, and predisposition explicated in premise [B] of AL). In other words, what degree of conviction (or certainty) is necessary for one's belief to qualify as "true"? What degree is sufficient to avoid eternal damnation or receive whatever benefit theistic belief might yield? Suppose, for example, that person X believes in God to degree A, whereas person Y believes to degree B (where B is greater than A); both believe in God, but the latter is palpably more confident in his belief than is the former. So does only person Y qualify as a "true" believer, or do both? Or is it that a still greater degree of conviction (say, degree C) is required for such a qualification? (This could itself be referred to as the "Sufficient-conviction Objection," as when entertained independently of the issues addressed below.)

Closely related to both this matter and the issues mentioned above in the "Inequity Objection" is the fact that some people, for various reasons, lack the intellectual capacity to properly (or fully) comprehend the proposition "God exists." It seems hopelessly unclear how such people's theism (or lack thereof) might be fairly and effectively evaluated by means of the sort of test described in TD. In his Nonbelief & Evil, Theodore M. Drange discusses this consideration as it relates to the God of evangelical Christianity:

[A] problem emerges in the case of a person who readily assents to and asserts the sentence "God's son saved humanity" but who does not, from a theological perspective, understand it properly. For example, suppose what the person actually believes is that God's son defused an atomic bomb by means of which Satan, the father of all terrorists, was attempting to blow up the earth. Would such a person pass the test or fail it?... The whole idea of belief-tests seems filled with unclarity and conceptual snares. (Original italics) [26]

He continues in the following paragraph:

If God were really interested in identifying people who willfully refuse to believe the propositions of the gospel message, then he ought to have made the evidence for [the truth of] those propositions quite good and quite convincing. It is only then that the reason for nonbelief would have to be something other than "unconvincing evidence." So it is only by providing a lot more evidence... than there already is that God could reasonably perform the sort of tests that TDN[27] attributes to him. What this shows is that there is no real conflict between God's desire [for all or most people to believe the gospel message] and his alleged desire that people's false pride be revealed. God could have gone ahead and provided a tremendous amount of evidence for the gospel message, enough to cause all or almost all people to accept the [the truth of] the propositions, and then see who the "holdouts" are. The ones who still do not believe the gospel message after all that may very be "willfully refusing to believe." In that way, God could have both of his desires fulfilled: he could have [all or most people believe the gospel message] and also perform the sort of test described in in TDN. Since those desires do not really conflict, it is proven that TDN is actually irrelevant to [the Argument from Nonbelief] and clearly does not refute it. (Original italics) [28]

Likewise, God could have simply made the evidence for his existence much stronger than it actually is, thereby greatly improving his ability to ascertain which humans are truly "stubborn" (and who therefore deserve censure of some kind). However, within the context of AL, not even that would have been necessary; as was underscored earlier, AL is not an argument which proceeds from the lack of good objective evidence for God's existence and the resultant nonbelief in his existence on the part of some humans.

Although most dispassionate and sensible people would assuredly agree that such a lack of evidence in and of itself lends a certain degree of plausibility to nonbelief in God, AL bypasses that issue altogether and merely inquires: irrespective of the alleged evidence regarding God's existence (or nonexistence), why is it that a deity who wants humans to believe in him would endow them (or permit them to be endowed) with the capacity, ability, and predisposition explicated in premise (B)? That is, why would he give them any means by which to even doubt (for what seem to be good reasons) his existence, even if it should be that such means somehow lead them into error? (And even if it were really the case that the capacity, ability, and predisposition explicated in premise [B] are all in some way deceptive or misapplied by humans[29]- which by all equitable accounts seems enormously implausible- it would still have to be explained why God has given people so many ways by which to arrive at the false conclusion that he is nonexistent [or at least probably nonexistent], ways that even the most religiously and philosophically impartial individuals regard as legitimate.)

As I have attempted to show, AL is different from any traditional atheological argument which derives simply from the fact that there exists (or occurs) what J.L. Schellenberg calls "reasonable nonbelief"[30] in that it entirely sidesteps the mere existence (or occurrence) of such nonbelief and goes directly to the heart of the quandary: if God were to exist and were to want humans to believe in him, people would have no way of rationally doubting his existence; yet, by the mere use of logic (as is demonstrated by AL), people can rationally doubt his existence. And the inference to be logically drawn from that pair of facts is that no such God exists.

In this way, where other atheological arguments- including, perhaps, Theodore M. Drange's Argument from Nonbelief- might be vulnerable to the admittedly groundless but nonetheless rather common idea that God is "beyond logic and reason" and therefore incapable of having either in any way meaningfully applied to him, AL is completely immune to it, for anyone who put forth such an assertion would remain obliged to explain why, if God indeed desires that humans believe in him, they are able to so drastically misapply those concepts to God's existence according to a methodology which appears, at least to rational individuals, so clearly and honestly fitting; and to accuse such individuals of deliberately employing that methodology in the fashion which best pleases or suits them would surely be an egregious mistake, as so few of them probably approach the matter with anything other than an open and wholly unprejudiced mind. (One exception to the aforementioned vulnerability might be Schellenberg's "Argument from Reasonable Nonbelief,"[31] which is in many respects comparable to AL, but, so far as I know, Schellenberg has never constructed that argument in any manner which does not include as one of God's properties omnibenevolence, which AL does not; while it would likely be strengthened somewhat if the deity to which it were applied were assumed to possess that attribute, the soundness of AL in no way relies upon that assumption. Schellenberg, on the other hand, seems to think that such an assumption- i.e., that God is omnibenevolent- is essential to any atheological argument that proceeds in some way from the concept of "reasonable nonbelief." [If that is not, in fact, what he thinks, he has failed to make that clear.] In this way, then, although the differences between AL and Schellenberg's argument are far less substantial than those between AL and other atheological arguments, the two in question are significantly separate from one another.)

In any case, the point remains that TD fails to disprove premise (A) of AL not because God has neglected to provide adequate evidence for his existence (even though that alone suffices to show that the world is considerably ill-suited for the purpose of the sort of test described in TD), but rather because humans are endowed with the capacity, ability, and predisposition explicated in premise (B); if God were to exist and truly desire to conduct such a test so as to identify people who "willfully" refuse to believe in him, it seems certain that he would not have so endowed humans (or permitted them to be so endowed). As we have seen, to suggest that he desires to separate from everyone else those who believe in him despite the given capacity, ability, and predisposition would be exceedingly implausible, implying that God is grossly unfair, totally irrational, and without foreknowledge, none of which the vast majority of theists believe him to be. Furthermore, hardly any nontheists "willfully" refrain from believing in God, but instead do so because it is the most tenable stance on the issue (as was demonstrated in the "Optimum-world Objection," above). Hence, TD stands refuted.

7.1. The Necessary-byproduct Defense (NBD)

What I shall call the "Necessary-byproduct Defense" can be summarized as follows: in order for human beings to possess some trait or feature indispensable to their intellectual and/or moral nature (i.e., something essential to their "humanness"), it was logically necessary for God to endow them (or permit them to be endowed) with the capacity, ability, and predisposition explicated in premise (B) of AL. Put another way, it would have been impossible for God to create humanity (or allow it to evolve) in the way he/it actually did had he not enabled them (or allowed them to become enabled) to employ those and similar capacities, etc. [32] Therefore, premise (A) of AL is false, which makes the argument unsound.

There are at least three significant objections to NBD, which together ought to confirm its inadequacy beyond a reasonable doubt.

7.2. The Conceivability Objection (to NBD)

NBD states that it was "logically necessary" for God to endow humans (or permit them to be endowed) with the capacity, ability, and predisposition explicated in premise (B) of AL in order to cause humanity to possess some specific (essential) trait or feature. But why believe that? It hardly seems plausible to suggest that humans could not either intellectually or morally resemble basically the same kind of species if they were to lack the given capacity, ability, and predisposition. How would the absence of any one of them in any way alter the fundamental characteristics of their intellect or moral intuition (if such a thing even exists, which is itself debatable)?

Certainly it seems reasonable to speculate that a person could still apprehend that a right angle equals ninety degrees or perceive that murdering children is evil without also discerning that, say, nothing exists outside of the physical universe; that is, it would be unduly hasty to assume any type of intrinsic or law-like correlation (or relationship) between the former capacities (or abilities) and the latter sort. I myself am inclined to deny such a correlation, especially when certain empirical considerations are taken into account. For instance, many people who, due to certain mental impairments, lack the capacity, ability, and/or predisposition explicated in premise (B) of AL nonetheless appear to perform competently enough in their everyday tasks and to possess what most would regard as an adequate (i.e., fairly conventional) sense of morality. Such people seem to function in basically the same way that most people do and yet are appreciably endowed with no capacity, ability, or predisposition of the sort explicated in premise (B). Obviously, if all three were somehow essential to the intellectual or moral structure of human beings, such people (apparently) could not exist, so it must not be the case that there is really the kind of correlation mentioned above.

Thus, there seems no good reason to think it was necessary for God to endow humans (or permit them to be endowed) with the given capacity, ability, and/or predisposition. Moreover, assuming that God is omnipotent (as we are for the time being), he could have created any world in any fashion he desired, including one in which the capacity, etc. were exceptionally rare or even altogether useless, if not simply nonexistent. For example, he could have created a world in which logic, reason, and science were either trivial or totally absent, endowing humans (or permitting them to be endowed) with dispositions so tremendously emotional that they would normally view reality and everything associated therewith as being negligible (and rightly so, given a world in which their earthly lives were ultimately of far less significance than their existence in the afterlife). Or, perhaps preferably, he could have constructed a world in which logic, etc. were of as much consequence as they are in the actual one but in which they (quite naturally) could be employed so as to corroborate his existence (or at least not disprove [or cast significant doubt over] it) , rather than the contrary. That is, they would generally serve the same purpose as they actually do, but would either fail to justify premise (C) of AL or somehow falsify it. Whatever the case, there is surely a vast (if not infinite) number of alternate worlds that he could have created wherein humans' possessing the particular traits and features they do would in no way necessitate that he endow them (or permit them to be endowed) with the capacity, ability, and predisposition explicated in premise (B).

Therefore, it is conceivable that God could have created such a world; there is nothing logically impossible about his ability to have done so. Thus, NBD fails.

7.3. The Deficient-result Objection (to NBD)

NBD seems to imply that there is something particularly desirable or beneficial about God's creating (or allowing to evolve) humans as he actually did; by suggesting (inaccurately, as was demonstrated above) that it would have been impossible for him to create (or allow to evolve) humans essentially identical to those which came to exist had he not caused them (whether directly or indirectly) to possess the capacity, ability, and predisposition explicated in premise (B) of AL, it further suggests that he had some compelling motivation for causing the existence of a species with specificially the kind of traits and features that humans possess. But what traits and features might they be, and what is so good about them?

One possible candidate for such a trait is free will (or moral freedom). But the view that humans actually possess anything like that was shown to be questionable in both the "Determinism Objection" (to FD) and the "Divine-foreknowledge Objection" (to FD), above. And even if it were assumed for the sake of argument that free will is a genuine attribute of mankind, the idea that there is some irreconcilable conflict between humans' possessing free will and their not being endowed with the capacity, ability, and predisposition in question was decisively refuted in the "Desirability-of-truth Objection" (to FD), as was the immensely popular belief that there exists such a conflict between humans' possessing both free will and an awareness of God's existence (although such a belief need not even be challenged within the context of AL). It should be evident, then, that any appeal to free will in an attempt to support NBD would be no less futile than it was in the case of FD.

Another possible example of a favorable human trait would be the altruistic tendencies which many people seem to exhibit. For instance, some people frequently donate to charities, volunteer their time at hospitals, homeless shelters, homes for abused and/or orphaned children, or assist people living in areas affected by natural disasters or other calamities. Such compassion is undoubtedly a feature of humans most would consider desirable; few, I imagine, would prefer to belong to a species with an overt proclivity for selfishness or malice.

Nevertheless, there arise major problems with this line of thought. First of all, what could possibly be the connection between the capacity, ability, and predisposition explicated in premise (B) and the benevolence to which some appear given? If anything, it would seem that the given capacity, etc. hamper whatever inclination people might have to perform kind deeds; some who understand and accept that atheism is the most tenable belief regarding the alleged existence of a deity (or deities) have probably at least once attempted to construe that fact in such a way as to justify their lack of charity (or perhaps even cruelty) toward others. As unfortunate and misguided as such attempts might be, it seems likely that those who engage in them would behave much differently if atheism were not the most tenable belief in the sense described (i.e., if theism were more tenable than atheism, as tenable as atheism, or if neither belief were tenable). Clearly, the fact that humans are endowed with the capacity, ability, and (as AL attempts to show) predisposition explicated in premise (B) constitutes one of the primary reasons that atheism is the most tenable belief in the aforementioned sense, so their not being endowed with the capacity, etc. would remove much of the existing support for atheism. Of course, this would, in turn, substantially undermine what such people take to be a justification for their apathy or truculence. So the fact that people are endowed with the given capacity, etc. seems generally to diminish their altruism (or at least not increase it); hence, even if there were a palpable connection between that feature of humans and the capacity, ability, and predisposition explicated in premise (B), it would certainly not be a desirable one.

Moreover, just as some humans are apt to perform great kindnesses, many seem more disposed toward committing unspeakable atrocities. The Holocaust would be a paradigm example of the barbarity of which our species is capable. Another would be the Spanish Inquisition. (Torquemada was alone responsible for the executions of more than two thousand people.) Still other examples could be cited, including the Crusades and the various slave trades established in earlier centuries. In addition, there seems no end to the violent crimes which occur with disturbing frequency: murder, torture, rape, sexual molestation, cruelty to animals, and so on. Whether it be perpetrated by individuals, groups, or governments, the infliction of harm upon innocent victims is plainly a universal occurrence. There can be little doubt that whatever the particular traits and features of our species, many of them produce situations that are far from favorable (by virtually any account). So if God intended to create (or allow to evolve) humans as he actually did for the sort of purpose intimated by NBD (i.e., to ensure that they would possess some clearly desirable set of inherent traits or features), one need only peruse a history book or a newspaper to ascertain that the result is markedly deficient.

Hence, one of NBD's underlying assumptions having been demolished, the defense itself appears unsound.

7.4. The Radical-view and Further-restrictions Objections (to NBD)

A final pair of objections, the first similar to the "Unpopular-view" issue mentioned above in connection with TD, I shall call the "Radical-view and Further-restrictions Objections." Although I believe the task of disposing of NBD has already been accomplished, I include these objections here simply to "seal the lid" (so to speak) on this third defense.

First, the basic idea behind NBD is not one which receives particularly great support from philosophers of religion or even theists in general. That God had to create the world or human beings in a certain way is a view that generally runs counter to the mainstream belief that he could have created any world or species he desired, in any way he liked, or even created nothing at all. While this no more proves NBD to be a failure than the "Unpopular-view Objection" alone refutes TD, it offers a comparably grim prognosis for the defense at hand.

Second, NBD asserts only that God was restricted in the given sense due to the logical impossibility of the alternative (a notion that has been shown to be totally bogus), but it seems to suggest other restrictions as well. For instance, the same sort of reasoning therein employed might be used to justify the claim that God could not have made lions unless he had also endowed them with manes, or that he could not have created an earth without also creating one with mountains. While it is obviously true that not even an omnipotent deity could have created the lions which actually came to exist or the earth that actually exists unless he had endowed the former with manes and the latter with mountains (both constituting actions which entail logical impossibilities, like creating a square circle), it certainly does not follow from that that he could not have created any lions without manes or any earth without mountains.

Perhaps an advocate of NBD might contend that the defense makes only the assertion mentioned above and in no way hints at any further restrictions (i.e., any that do not stem from a logical impossibility), but there seems reason for suspicion; if such an advocate is prepared to argue that humans would not be essentially the same creatures if they were to lack the capacity, ability, and predisposition explicated in premise (B), he could easily be prepared to argue that virtually any attribute of anything in existence is somehow essential to the nature of that thing, which would almost certainly be erroneous. More important, there is a great deal of unclarity surrounding the whole issue of what constitutes an integral characteristic of something, an obscurity which would severely damage NBD even if the first two objections thereto could be refuted. Numerous questions would need to be addressed: what is the criterion or criteria for determining what attributes of a being or thing are "essential," and who is to formulate it? Assuming any kind of criteria could be formulated, could a being or thing be properly referred to as that being or thing if it were to lack one of those attributes? If so, how? And if not, what exactly would it become once it lacked that attribute? And finally, despite the fact that NBD refers explicitly only to what it (inaccurately) assumes to be a logical impossibility, is there not a chance that it really does suggest the further restrictions discussed above? (Such a question would introduce a kind of "slippery slope" problem for an advocate of NBD, requiring that he satisfactorily answer the preceding questions in order to draw a clear line beyond which said restrictions never extend; that is, for him to argue simply that God is restricted only to that which is logically possible would be insufficient, for he would first need to clarify precisely what constitutes an essential property of a being or thing and then show how such a property might necessarily entail a particular capacity, ability, and/or predisposition, as some essential trait[s] or feature[s] of humans, according to NBD, necessarily entail[s] their being endowed with the capacity, ability, and predisposition explicated in premise [B] of AL.)

Coupled with the first two objections to NBD, these further complications make it clear that the defense should be rejected, if not on the basis that it is unsound (as it has been amply shown to be), then on the grounds that it appears irretrievably nebulous.

8.1. The Unknown-Purpose Defense (UPD)

The final defense which I shall examine herein is one Theodore M. Drange calls the "Unknown-purpose Defense." As with the "Testing Defense" (above), although Drange's emphasis is on the strength of UPD as applied to the God of evangelical Christianity, some of his remarks on the subject shall be relevant to the present topic.

UPD, concisely formulated, is as follows: God (conceived as a being who desires that humans believe in him) does have some purpose for endowing humans (or permitting them to be endowed) with the capacity, ability, and predisposition explicated in premise (B) of AL, but it is a purpose of which we are unaware, whether it be necessarily unknowable to humans or merely unknown to them at present. (Those who subscribe to the former hypothesis would probably argue that this purpose is incomprehensible to humans, as is probably God himself, whereas those who think the latter to be correct would likely say that the data relevant to God is currently incomplete and therefore precludes the reliability of any judgments concerning his motives or intentions.) In short, God has some rational justification for his endowing humans (or permitting them to be endowed) with the capacity, etc. in question despite his desire that they believe in him, but exactly what it is (or even what it might be) is unclear to us.

An equally concise explanation of the issues surrounding UPD is offered by Drange:

[W]hat are we to make of... the claim that God exists but has some unknown purpose which, if known, would adequately explain why he has chosen to remain hidden? It would be a purpose which necessarily conflicts with his desire for universal theistic belief among humans but which outweighs and overrides it, thereby falsifying [the assertion that God, if he were to exist, would want nothing that necessarily conflicts with his desire for humans to believe in him]. Is there any good reason to deny that there is a deity who has such an unknown purpose? [33]

In an earlier part of his book, he expounds two different versions of UPD:

[Those versions] may be called the actualist version and the possibilist version. Both affirms God's existence. But it is only the actualist version which declares that there actually exists a purpose on God's part which explains and justifies [the fact that humans are endowed with the capacity, ability, and predisposition explicated in premise (B) of AL]. The possibilist version claims not that God definitely has such a purpose, but only that it is possible that he does, in which case [AL's premise (A)] is merely possibly false. It thereby aims to show only that [AL] fails as a conclusive proof of God's nonexistence because it does not establish a necessary connection between God's existence and [his not having endowed humans (or permitted them to be endowed) with the capacity, ability, and predisposition explicated in AL's premise (B)]. (Original italics) [34]

Well, this is a point I shall gladly concede. After all, AL was not intended to be a conclusive proof of God's nonexistence to begin with. It purports merely to demonstrate that there is good reason to deny God's existence, as does Drange's Argument from Nonbelief. (However, it is unlike ANB in that it aims to show that there is good reason to deny the existence of any deity who desires that humans believe in him, whereas ANB targets chiefly the God of evangelical Christianity, along with the deities of Orthodox Judaism and liberal Christianity.) I would say, in fact, that AL provides very good grounds for denying the existence of such a deity, perhaps even stronger than those provided by ANB and the traditional atheological arguments. In any case, it is by no means supposed to be conclusive, so the possibilist version of UPD is irrelevant to AL.

So the issue here is that of which view, the relevant form of theism (i.e., the belief in a deity who desires that humans believe in him) or its denial, is the more reasonable one to embrace in light of the available evidence. The question now becomes one of probability: is it more probable that God actually has the sort of unknown purpose described in UPD or that no such God exists? In the follwing four objections, I shall endeavor to show why the latter is much more likely true than the former.

8.2. The Burden-of-proof Objection (to UPD)

UPD claims the existence of something, namely, that of a certain purpose which God has that adequately explains his having endowed humans (or permitted them to be endowed) with the capacity, ability, and predisposition explicated in premise (B) of AL. Anyone who claims the existence of something automatically assumes the burden of proving that the given thing actually exists. But UPD fails to prove that God really has such a purpose. Hence, UPD can be reasonably doubted.

Is that a sound argument? I believe so, but the matter is not quite as simple as it might appear to those who instinctively agree with it. One might attack such an argument on the basis that, while it is certainly true that advocates of UPD have a burden-of-proof they must meet, so do advocates of AL, for it, too, puts forth a positive assertion: that if the type of deity in question (i.e., one who desires that humans believe in him) were to exist, humans would not be endowed with the capacity, ability, and predisposition explicated in premise (B) of AL. This is a point well taken, but the obstacle it presents is only a temporary one. AL has numerous advantages that UPD lacks, which, as I intend to demonstrate, both satisfy the burden-of-proof incurred by advocates of AL and render it a far more plausible hypothesis tham UPD.

8.3. The Loving-God Objection (to UPD)

Most theists believe that God loves humanity maximally and that he desires a close, personal relationship with people. Obviously, for God to endow humans (or permit them to be endowed) with the capacity, ability, and predisposition explicated in premise (B) of AL would create something of a barrier between him and humanity, making it unnecessarily difficult for them to know and love him. Yet, people are, in fact, generally endowed with the given capacity, etc., so it is unlikely that any such deity exists.

Advocates of UPD could, of course, simply accept this and contend that God does not desire any sort of intimate relationship with people. In that case, the "Loving-God Objection" would carry no weight against UPD. However, as was indicated above, most theists do conceive of God in the given way, and for those people such an objection would pose a serious problem indeed. Therefore, those theists who view God as desiring the aforementioned kind of relationship with humanity ought to reject UPD.

8.4. The Superior-explanation Objection (to UPD)

AL offers a reasonable explanation for why humans are endowed with the capacity, ability, and predisposition explicated in premise (B): there exists no deity who desires that humans believe in him; the capacity, etc. are merely the product of naturalistic causes. UPD, on the other hand, can only explain that fact by an appeal to a kind of "great mystery": God, who desires belief in his existence on the part of humans, has some unknown purpose for endowing them (or permitting them to be endowed) with said capacity, etc. Clearly, AL is a simpler and more plausible explanation than UPD. As Theodore M. Drange writes:

For an explanatory hypothesis to appeal to mystery is self-defeating, inasmuch as the purpose of explanation is to enlighten and thereby remove any mystery that surrounds a phenomenon. [UPD] conceives of God as a doubly mysterious being, failing to explain not only why he [endowed humans (or permitted them to be endowed) with the capacity, ability, and predisposition explicated in premise (B) of AL], but also why he keeps his motivations on this matter secret from us, including his motivation for the secrecy itself. Since we appeal to hypotheses for illumination, to solve mysteries and to eliminate anomalies, we naturally prefer those that do not leave us in the end with new anomalies and even greater mysteries. So that is a [good] reason... to prefer [AL] over [UPD] and for saying that [AL] is the more reasonable hypothesis of the two. Just the fact that there is a phenomenon which [AL] can adequately explain but which [UPD] cannot... makes [AL] the preferable hypothesis. [35]

As Drange has more recently commented, "Mere appeal to parsimony would dictate that we prefer the explanatory hypothesis of God's nonexistence to a story about a 'mysterious God' which leaves the relevant facts totally unexplained." [36]

There can be little doubt, then, that AL (at least as an explanation) is superior to UPD. Hence, UPD should be rejected.

8.5. The Probability Objection (to UPD)

This objection is closely related to the previous one in that it appeals to the likelihood of AL's truth compared to that of UPD's truth. Virtually any rational person would agree that AL has a greater a priori probability than does its competitor (UPD). This is due to the fact that AL appeals to fewer contingencies than UPD; whereas the former suggests that the capacity, ability, and predisposition explicated in premise (B) came about as a result of purely naturalistic occurrences, the latter claims all of the following: first, that God exists; second, that God desires belief in his existence on the part of humans; third, that God has some unknown purpose for endowing humans (or permitting them to be endowed) with the given capacity, etc.; and fourth, that God has some unknown purpose for the secrecy surrounding his reason for doing so (which, if known, would adequately explain both the secrecy surrounding that reason and the reason itself). Because AL makes only one claim while UPD makes at least four, AL can be thought to have a far better chance of corresponding with reality than can UPD. Theodore M. Drange offers an analogy:

[There exist] ten boxes. One hypothesis simply states that that at least one of the boxes is empty, whereas another hypothesis states that none of the boxes is empty. Without any further information about the matter, it is obvious that the first hypothesis is more likely to be true than the second, for we could assign a probability of one-half to the proposition that any given box is empty. Then the probability that at least one of the ten boxes is empty would be over 99 percent. It is for a similar reason that [AL] is much more likely to be true than [UPD] and is therefore the more reasonable of the hypotheses. [37]

Together with the "Superior-explanation Objection," this further objection should suffice to show that UPD is considerably weaker than AL.

8.6. The Omnipotence Objection (to UPD)

This objection addresses the idea that the unknown purpose in question is (or may be) beyond humans' ken (i.e., beyond their comprehension). Such a view seems common among theists who advocate some version of UPD (even if they do not refer to it by that name), as is evidenced by John Hick's suggestion (in connection with "The Desirability-of-truth Objection" [to FD], above) that a divine being and his purposes would probably "overwhelm" human consciousness.

An obvious problem with such a claim is that God, an omnipotent being (as we have thus far assumed him to be), should have no trouble devising some method by which to enable humans to comprehend the aforementioned purpose. There are a number of ways in which he could go about undertaking that task. One particularly effective technique is proposed by Theodore M. Drange:

[An omnipotent deity could, for example,] give people enough of a "brain boost" or else use his infinite power of explanation (or both) to get them to comprehend the given purpose. [Advocates of UPD] need to postulate still another unknown divine purpose to explain why God does not do that, which further weakens their theory.[38]

Indeed, the contention that God has some (other) unknown purpose for not revealing the original purpose only deepens the "Great Mystery" mentioned above, compounding the dilemma to such a great extent that UPD becomes exceedingly difficult to defend, if not altogether untenable. So if God is conceived as being omnipotent (as he has thus far been supposed to be), UPD is almost certainly unsound.

8.7. The Reasonableness Objection (to UPD)

A final objection to UPD is what I shall call the "Reasonableness Objection." It is a kind of agglomeration of the previous objections, serving to emphasize the underlying distinction between UPD and AL: the former is a far less reasonable hypothesis than the latter, as should be overwhelmingly evident by now. But perhaps this distinction has eluded some readers, in spite of what has already been said. If so, then some remarks made by Theodore M. Drange should help to clarify the matter:

[W]e need to "call 'em as we see 'em." If humanity has tried as hard as it can to discover something, but without success, then it does seem reasonable to hypothesize (for the time being at least, until new evidence comes in) that the thing probably does not exist... Consider an analogy. Suppose Mr. X were to believe that there is a worldwide conspiracy against him. He thinks that people all over the world are plotting against him, as their main occupation in life. Mr. X's psychiatrist points out to him that they are not in fact exhibiting such "plotting" behavior. They do not gesture or glance at Mr. X when he is in their vicinity or try to follow him. Suppose Mr. X concedes that point, but counters with the claim that people are sly and crafty. Although they are plotting against him, they are smart enough to conceal that fact. Then the absence of "plotting" behavior would not be evidence against the plotting. The claim that people are sly and crafty makes Mr. X's conspiracy hypothesis unfalsifiable, for Mr. X could always say, "They effectively conceal their plotting." (Original italics) [39]

Similarly, the theory that God has some unknown divine reason for having endowed humans (or permitting them to be endowed) with the capacity, ability, and predisposition explicated in premise (B) of AL is unfalsifiable; no matter how obvious it might seem that a deity who desires that humans believe in him would not allow them to be so endowed, an advocate of UPD could simply respond by saying, "Well, he has some justification for having done it, however arcane it might be." Without even a shred of good evidence for God's existence, there is no reason to regard UPD as any more rational or plausible than the (assuredly absurd) conspiracy theory which Drange's Mr. X espouses. Therefore, UPD is not only much less likely true than AL, but is actually quite ridiculous.

Clearly, then, advocates of AL have provided a sufficient case for their assertion that any deity desiring belief in his existence on the part of humans would not endow them (or permit them to be endowed) with the capacity, ability, and predisposition explicated in premise (B), thereby satisfying the burden-of-proof mentioned above. But advocates of UPD have not, as yet, satisfied the burden-of-proof which they face. On that basis alone (if not on the grounds supplied by the previous four objections), UPD should be rejected.

9.1. Challenges to Premise (B)

The foregoing defenses were attempts of various kinds to disprove premise (A) of AL, ways that theists might try to justify humans' being endowed with the capacity, ability, and predisposition explicated in premise (B). As we have seen, all such defenses are failures.

This brings us to a different set of objections to AL, whose aim is almost the reverse of those we have thus far examined. I shall call them "Challenges to Premise (B)," for they attack, in one way or another, the legitimacy of the alleged capacity, ability, and predisposition explicated therein. Put another way, rather than attempt to justify humans' being endowed with the given capacity, etc., these objections flat-out deny that humans actually possess them. One such line of attack, which I shall dub "The Misapplication-of-reason-and-science Defense" (to be abbreviated MRSD), is to argue that humans misapply reason, science, etc. when evaluating the evidence and/or information surrounding God's existence. That is, when it comes to speculating about the existence of such a being, they should not be employing such methods at all, for God is beyond reason and science, either necessarily or because humans are not yet sufficiently intellectually advanced (i.e., they do not yet possess an adequate knowledge of their own species and its relationship with the cosmos, how, in short, everything is ultimately set up) to properly apply such methods to a deity. An advocate of MRSD would probably make the claim that God is an incomprehensible being, that he "transcends" logic, so all atheological arguments based thereupon are, in fact, hopelessly misguided and totally irrelevant to the issue.

Another challenge to premise (B) may be called the "Invalid-inferences Defense" (to be abbreviarted IID). It is analogous to MRSD in that it calls into question the legitimacy of the alleged capacity, ability, and predisposition explicated in premise (B). But it is unlike MRSD in that its contention is not that humans misapply the aforementioned methods with regard to God's existence, but simply that all (or at least most) of what are claimed within premise (B) to be valid inferences and assertions (upon which, of course, the soundness of AL directly depends) are, in fact, invalid. Whether reason and science could be accurately applied to God's existence is a separate concern, one of no consequence to the defense in question; it suggests merely that in the case of premise (B), reason and science have been improperly employed.

A final and rather extreme challenge to premise (B) is what I shall call the "Illusion Defense" (to be abbreviated ID). The basic idea behind it is that reason and science are simply "illusions," that they have no real basis in fact and that humans somehow misperceive their true nature. According to ID, we are mistaken in thinking that they serve any useful purpose, no matter how much they might appear to. In truth, they are deceptive and fallacious, seemingly of value only because our limited, finite minds are unable to penetrate the sophisticated mask behind which their actual (erroneous) nature lies.

9.2. The Misapplication-of-reason-and-science Defense (MRSD)

There are at least three substantial objections which could be raised against MRSD. First, quite simply, what good reason is there to think that humans in any way misapply reason and science when evaluating the evidence regarding God's existence? Similarly, what motivation have we to assume that God is exempt from either? If God is indeed responsible for the existence of the world and its human inhabitants (whether directly or indirectly), he must therefore be responsible for the natural laws and forces to which those creatures are subject, and likewise the capacity, etc. which are within their power to employ. Thus, God must be ultimately responsible for science and reason both, from which it is surely legitimate to infer that both ought to be compatible with his existence. But, as we have seen, neither is compatible with his existence, which brings us back to AL. And as the argument aims to demonstrate, mere logic should therefore make it clear that God (defined as a being who desires that humans believe in him) does not exist.

Second, it would be erroneous to claim that theists have traditionally attempted to substantiate the existence of a deity through appeals to faith alone. In fact, many theologians have endeavored, at various points throughout the ages, to prove the existence of such a being by appealing directly to reason. Anselm's Ontological Argument is a perfect example of such an attempt. Other rational attempts to confirm God's existence include virtually all those arguments which proceed, in one way or another, from natural theology. All the traditional theistic arguments (e.g., Cosmological, Telological, etc.) constitute such efforts. It seems, then, that many theists throughout history have not taken God to be "beyond reason and science" (as MRSD claims), trying, in fact, to demonstrate his existence by employing those very methods. Furthermore, I doubt that most theists in the world today would deny that any knowledge of God can be attained by means of rational thought and observation. Such a hypothesis receives strong support from some of the remarks commonly made by those who profess a belief in the existence of a supreme being. For instance, many such people often make the claim that the "rational and orderly" nature of the universe provides good evidence for a rational deity, and sometimes assert that "nothing could exist unless God were to exist" (or something to that effect). Whether misguided or not, those views make it clear that at least some theists would disagree with the idea that God's existence can be ascertained strictly through faith. Hence, even some theists would have to reject MRSD, a fact which significantly weakens it.

Third, and most substantial, as was pointed out above (in the "Degree Objection" [to TD]), even assuming that God does somehow transcend reason and science, advocates of MRSD (or an analogous defense) would still need to explain why people are able to so drastically misapply them to God's existence. In other words, even assuming that humans do misapply them in the given way, why would God allow that to happen? Why would he allow them to so frequently arrive at false conclusions by improperly employing the capacity, etc. contained in premise (B) of AL? Certainly that does not seem like something one would expect from a deity who desires that humans believe in him. (I should like to remind the reader that appealing in any way to humans' free will in an attempt to defend MRSD [or an analogous defense] would be ill-advised in light of the objections to FD, above.)

For all of these reasons, MRSD fails to cast any reasonable doubt over the truth of AL's premise (B), which thus remains intact.

9.3. The Invalid-inferences Defense (IID)

IID suggests not that God is necessarily beyond reason and science, but instead simply that they have been misapplied (or misinterpreted) in the context of AL's premise (B). That is, according to IID, all (or most) of the inferences and assertions actually contained in that premise are invalid. Obviously, in order to refute this defense, it shall be necessary to examine in greater detail the premise under scrutiny. Let us proceed to do so.

The first part of the initial claim made in (B1) is that the capacity to reason has often led many humans to question God's existence. Well, this is simply an empirical matter; it is a fact that the given capacity, whether justifiably or otherwise, has been employed by many as a means by which to challenge the popular belief that there exists a supreme being of some kind. It has been so employed by countless philosophers, and surely by millions in the general public. Hence, there can be no doubt that this part of the claim in question is true.

The second part of that claim is that reason suggests that if God were to exist, there would probably be clear, objective evidence for his existence. But does reason really suggest that? Why should God have any motivation for providing such evidence? There are two main reasons for this. One is that God, as he is here being considered, desires that humans believe in him, so it would be greatly beneficial for him to supply humans with clear, objective evidence for his existence. Another is that, quite simply, there is good evidence for virtually anything which exists; things which exist typically seem to yield some indication of their existence. (This would seem especially true in the case of a supernatural being whom most believe to be the all-powerful creator of the universe, though I shall refrain from pursuing here the implications of such divine attributes in relation to this matter, as the only property of God relevant to AL as formulated in the present essay is his desire that humans believe in him [in addition, possibly, to omnipotence, an issue I shall take up shortly].) Both of these ideas are challenged by Theodore M. Drange, who says the following:

[T]here are other ways for God to bring about belief than by means of good objective evidence. One way, for example, would be by direct implantation of belief in people's minds. Another way, emphasized by Schellenberg, is for God to reveal himself to people by means of private religious experiences... [Also], the fact that we do not as yet have evidence [of God] does not entail that we will never acquire such evidence or that [God does not exist]. [40]

While I certainly accept all of this, I think Drange is mistaken in his contention that neither of the given reasons (for why it seems likely that there should be good objective evidence for God, assuming he exists) is valid. I shall readily grant that there are ways by which God could cause humans to believe in him other than providing good objective evidence for his existence, such as those suggested in the quote above (i.e., direct implantation and religious experiences). But what Drange apparently fails to appreciate is the fact that God, assuming he exists, has not employed any such method. People have not had such belief directly implanted in their minds, nor have they, by and large, undergone the sort of experiences in question (as far as we know, at least). And there is no evidence to suggest that God has brought about said belief by any other method, either, seeing as how there are so many nontheists in the world. Thus, since God desires that humans believe in him, it stands to reason that providing such evidence is precisely the method he should employ for the given purpose. But, as has already been established, no such evidence exists. Hence, it is reasonable to declare that the lack of good objective evidence for God's existence on its own constitutes some degree of justification for nonbelief in God (as herein defined).

With regard to Drange's reply to the second reason for believing the aforementioned assertion (i.e., that if God were to exist, there would naturally be good objective evidence for his existence), although it is logically possible that humans might one day acquire such evidence, there is no good reason at present to believe that they will. And, indeed, our experience clearly shows that things which exist tend to somehow reveal themselves; for everything whose existence was once unknown to humans (or which remains unknown to them), there are surely thousands of things which have been known to them since the dawn of man. Why? Because, in Drange's own words, things which exist generally "leave clear tracks."[41] Moreover, irrespective of the various attributes which one ascribes to God, practically every concept thereof is one of a being that would almost certainly produce some kind of evidence for its existence. Therefore, it is most definitely reasonable to assert that if God were to exist and desire that humans believe in him, there would probably be clear, objective evidence for that.

The next inference contained in (B1) is this: because nobody remembers anything prior to the start of his physical life, probably nobody experiences anything ensuing his physical death. This could be attacked from two different angles. The first is to simply deny that nobody remembers anything prior to the start of his physical life. Some people (usually those who believe in some form of reincarnation) claim to clearly remember events which occurred before they were born; it has become almost commonplace for people to talk about their "past lives," suggesting a substantial increase in the number of those who subscribe to the rather bizarre notion of "souls" that inhabit numerous bodies at different times. Of course, some who engage in what I call "past-lives talk" are not serious about it, really meaning that they occasionally experience some queer form of "deja vu" or observe a particularly remarkable coincidence that on the surface might be construed as the result of "fate." But certainly some people honestly assent to the occurrence of such multiple lives, and might therefore challenge the statement in question.

The problems facing such an attack are grave. Foremost among them is the fact that there is no way to reliably verify one's claim that he/she experienced something before his/her birth. How can we know for sure that such a person is telling the truth? His/her claim is no more falsifiable than the assertion that there is presently an invisible man walking on the moon, detectable to neither our senses nor any scientific equipment. Additionally, the vast majority of those who claim to have experienced something in a "past life" are impartial on the matter of whether or not such lives really occur, favoring the view that they do occur. Many probably even presuppose that, accepting it as readily as they accept the fact of their own respiration. So there is good reason to be suspicious of anyone who makes such a claim. Second, it is undeniable that most people do not allege to have experienced anything prior to their birth. Rarely does someone born in 1960 seriously suggest that he/she recalls World War II. No more often does someone born in 1983 claim to remember Reagan's first year as president. Hence, virtually everyone would accept the assertion that it is impossible for one to have experienced anything prior to the start of his physical life.

The second and far more likely way that the inference in question might be attacked is by challenging its validity on the grounds that there is currently either no available data concerning what one experiences (if anything) ensuing his physical death, or that such data is available but that it indicates just the opposite of the given inference: people probably do experience something after death. The latter view is addressed by Theodore M. Drange:

Some think that empirical evidence has been found that supports the existence of an afterlife. They may point to reports of near-death experiences or reincarnations or ghosts summoned by mediums. But as I see it, all this is misguided. Near-death experiences are not relevant to the concept of [life following reducible death, as opposed to mere technical death, the former occurring only when one's body and brain have been totally destroyed], for the situation does not even involve technical death, let alone the complete destruction of the body and brain. With alleged reincarnations, the main issue has to do with identifying the person as someone who had died... So far as I know, this has never been accomplished satisfactorily in any of the cases studied. And alleged ghosts summoned by mediums have been shown to be hoaxes in many cases. It is possible that that they are all hoaxes or in some other way explainable naturalistically. [42]

Perhaps most germane to our discussion is Drange's next comment:

It doesn't make sense to try to find evidence for a proposition before before one has rendered intelligible what that proposition is supposed to be. Before one can even make sense of the evidential problem (i.e., the problem of whether or not there is any evidence for an afterlife), one first needs to solve the conceptual problem, which is the problem of what the term "afterlife" might mean in operational terms, or what an afterlife could possibly be like if there were such a state. [43]

These points are all well taken, particularly the last. The fact is, there exists neither uncontroversial evidence for any sort of afterlife wherein one retains his earthly identity and consciousness nor any clear way to resolve the conceptual dilemma to which Drange refers (i.e., that of first coherently defining the term "afterlife" and then explaining precisely what such a state might entail). That dilemma is a serious one not only for those who postulate the existence of an afterlife, but also for those who postulate even that one might exist. For that reason (and others Drange presents in his Nonbelief & Evil, pp. 364-377), the hypothesis that there exists such a state ought to be rejected.

Moreover, there are good reasons to accept the inference in question (i.e., that probably nobody experiences anything ensuing his physical death). One such reason is that scientists have ascertained that certain types of brain damage are invariably followed by a loss of mental function, which seems to suggest that complete destruction of the brain results in total annihilation of the mind. Also, other correlations between the brain and mind have been discovered, including connections between specific brain states and particular kinds of thoughts, emotions, dreams, etc. And as far as the idea of a "soul" is concerned, it is doubtful that the term could be any more coherently defined than the term "afterlife"; just what such an entity might constitute is extremely vague, and even if some intelligible explanation for it could be constructed, there would seem to be no clear, objective way to determine the correctness (or incorrectness) thereof. It, like UPD and the "invisible-man-on-the-moon" theory, appears entirely unfalsifiable. Thus, to appeal to any sort of "soul" as a means by which to defend the possible existence of an afterlife would almost certainly be ineffectual.

The third inference contained in (B1) (i.e., that people's minds are merely an epiphenomenon of their brains) could be defended along similar lines, so there is no need to analyze it further. The fourth, like the claim that reason has led many to question God's existence, rests strictly on empirical considerations: the theory of evolution is now widely accepted by both philosophers and scientists, as well as a substantial segment of the general public (if not the majority thereof). Even Pope John Paul II has declared evolution to be part of God's "master plan" for humanity. This is due primarily to the excellent evidence that has been discovered to support Darwin's hypothesis: the fossil evidence of the geological column, the fact that there are many million different species of organisms in the world, anatomical similarities among animals, etc. At the very least, the theory in question is far more tenable than any proposed by creationists. So the aforementioned inference (i.e., that humans were not specially created) seems perfectly legimitate.

The fifth and final inference which appears in (B1) is that if God's existence were readily apparent to humans, there would be much less confusion among theists regarding his nature and far fewer nontheists in the world than there actually are. Why should we believe this? The reasons are closely akin to those put forth in connection with the initial claim made in (B1) (i.e., that if God were to exist, there would probably be clear, objective evidence for that). That is, because there is evidence for virtually everything which exists (as well as the nature of most things which exist) and since God desires belief in his existence on the part of humans, it is reasonable to suppose that, if God were to exist, theists would generally be in agreement concerning his nature and there would be very few nontheists in the world. But it is not the case that theists are generally in agreement concerning his nature and that there are very few nontheists in the world; dissent among believers is quite extensive, and there are probably at least a billion nontheists in the world (one-fourth of whom describe themselves as atheists). Hence, there is no good reason to doubt the validity of the inference in question.

The first part of the initial claim made in (B2) is that humans possess the ability to ascertain empirical data, assess that data, and draw from it reasonable inferences. This I take to be self-evident. The second part of that claim is that many such inferences indicate that only physical entities exist and that supernatural beings and realms are purely imaginary. Why should we accept this? Well, simply put, no good evidence has ever been found for any nonphysical entity which exists indepedently of matter (which is what I think most people mean by "nonphysical entity"). Even if we assume thoughts and emotions to be nonphysical (an assumption which materialists would challenge), it has already been shown that such entities almost assuredly cannot exist apart from matter (i.e., the brain). And with regard to supernatural beings and realms, no good evidence has been discovered for those, either. They seem more the stuff of fairy tales and fantasy books than any actual constituent of the universe. In fact, the very idea of something existing outside of space and time separate of anything physical is in a way incoherent; if something neither exists within space and time nor depends for its existence on something which does, within what and how does it exist? Any attempt to intelligibly answer this question seems doomed from the outset, the basis for any such response being almost certain to crumble under the weight of both empirical and conceptual considerations.

Thus, the next inference contained in (B2) (i.e., that there exist no such places as heaven or hell) has already been adequately dealt with. The next claim proposed therein is that natural laws have neither exceptions nor deviations. Well, why should we believe this? I would say there are at least three good reasons to do so. First of all, every law of nature is supported by a vast body of evidence, whereas all alleged violations of any such law have been supported by either no evidence at all or else evidence that most would consider negligible. (It should be noted that even when a certain law of nature is discovered to have some exception or qualification, that is in no way equivalent to a violation of said law; rather, it is merely a particular feature thereof, one of the properties which serves to define it. As a rough comparison, just as one of the characteristics of automobiles is that they require gasoline in order to operate, so might certain laws of nature require a special condition [or conditions] in order to obtain; and just as no rational individual would view the former as a violation of the "axiom" that "automobiles possess a capacity for operating," none should view the latter as a violation of any law of nature. In order for something to qualify as a legitimate violation of any such law, it would need to necessarily defy scientific explanation, i.e., be incapable of being explained naturalistically.) Second, since there is no good evidence for any sort of nonphysical entity (as defined above), then it follows that all entities which exist are probably physical, or at least dependent on some physical entity for their existence. And, obviously, everything which is physical must conform to the laws of nature. Hence, it is impossible for there to occur a violation of any such law. Lastly, quite apart from scientific considerations, every day we witness the laws of nature at work: when we drop things, gravity consistently pulls them to the earth. When we exert upon things a certain degree of pressure, they consistently move at precisely the velocity and travel precisely the distance (all variables taken into account) occasioned by the energy transferred from our bodies thereto. On the other hand, remarkable it would be indeed if we were to drop an ordinary pencil and then observe it sail off into outer space, or if we were to kick an empty cardboard box (assuming there is nothing obstructing it) with all our strength and yet scarcely cause it to budge. So, just based on the experience of our everday lives, there is good reason to believe that the sort of laws in question are most certainly immutable.

I have, I believe, already duly addressed the issues surrounding the next two claims contained in (B2) (i.e., that everything can be explained naturalistically and that miracles do not actually occur); my previous remarks should suffice to dispose of any objections which might be raised against those claims, my defense of the first constituting, by virtue of its logical consequence, a justification for the second. That brings us to the final claim made in (B2): that no deity was necessary for the creation (or existence) of the universe as we know it. There are several approaches that could be taken in order to substantiate this assertion. Perhaps the oldest and most familiar among them was suggested by the pre-Socratic atomist Democritus: that matter, energy, and space are irreducible components of the universe which necessarily exist.[44] That would satisfy any demand for a "first cause" of the present universe (an idea to which nearly all theists subscribe, quite naturally holding God to be the originator of the aforementioned components, presumably along with time) without in any way appealing to the existence of a supreme being. A more recent and thorough approach (i.e., that the universe came into existenced uncaused), which I shall here briefly pursue, seems popular with a large number of philosophers. One of them is Quentin Smith, who says the following:

The claim that the beginning of our universe has a cause conflicts with current scientific theory. The scientific theory is called the wave function of the universe. It has been developed in the past ten years or so by Stephen Hawking, Andre Vilenkin, Alex Linde, and many others. Their theory is that there is a scientific law of nature called the Wave Function of the Universe that implies that it is highly probable that a universe with our characteristics will come into existence without a cause. All of the numbers cancel out except for a universe with features our universe possesses. For example, [one which] contains intelligent organisms such as humans. This remaining universe has a certain probability very high- near to a hundred percent- of coming into existence uncaused. [45]

Therefore, that no deity was necessary in order for our universe to come about is not only possible but actually very probable. In fact, as Smith makes clear, most likely there was no "first cause" at all; the universe simply began to exist (about fifteen billion years ago) without any antecedent whatsoever. Thus, there is no good reason to doubt the final claim made in (B2).

(B3) consists entirely of statements (i.e., that most people possess a predisposition to skepticism, especially of positive assertions for which there exists no concrete or convincing proof, etc.) that can be verified empirically, so it would be superfluous to investigate it at great length. Mere observational evidence should suffice to confirm it: people hardly ever (in general) accept anything as true unless they have good reason to believe it. If somebody asserts, for example, that there is an evil spirit causing havoc in his cellar, it is rather expected that his friend should ask (assuming he takes the claim seriously to begin with), "What proof do you have?" (or something to that effect). Granted, such situations rarely occur, but the incredulity with which most naturally approach arguable claims is evidenced in our everyday lives, as well. For instance, if someone were seeking to purchase a new car, it is doubtful that he would readily accept everything the salesman told him about the first automobile he considered buying; and if he were to, most people would probably accuse him of being gullible. Another example would be that of a school teacher discovering that one of her students has cheated on a test. Suppose the student, in an attempt to justify his infraction, were to submit that strange voices inside his head commanded him to cheat. Unless she were particularly naive, that the teacher would scarcely hesitate to believe such an excuse seems quite improbable; what is far more likely is that she would send the student directly to the principal's office, convinced of the boy's culpability and rather disgusted by his (inept) effort to bamboozle her. Likewise, people are generally mistrustful of any assertion that cannot be adequately supported at least inferentially; many (staunch empiricists, for the most part) even require physical evidence before they will assent to something. But the best support for the given assertion (i.e., that most people refuse to accept out of hand any claim that is not obviously true) is one that may have escaped the reader altogether: ironically, any suspicion regarding that assertion serves only to strengthen it. That is, the very fact that said assertion is apt to be questioned helps considerably to substantiate it, the assertion being that most people are apt to question arguable claims.

The only other item in (B3) that I suppose might call for some clarification is "wishful thinking": what, exactly, is meant by this? Well, just what it usually means: strongly desiring that something exist or occur in spite of good evidence that it does not exist or that it will not occur. Another name for it might be "blind faith," although the connotation of that expression might differ slightly from that of the other (most, I imagine, would equate "blind faith" with a frame of mind somewhat more irrational than the sort suggested by mere "wishful thinking"). In any case, the truth of the premise in question ought to be evident by now.

It should be clear, then, that IID is a failure. As we have seen, none of the inferences or assertions contained in premise (B) can be reasonably doubted, let alone all (or even most) of them. Moreover, as has already been explained, even if those inferences and assertions could be disproved, advocates of IID, like those of MRSD, would still be confronted with the burden of having to explain why God, who desires that humans believe in him, has permitted them to be so drastically led astray. Hence, AL remains a sound argument for the nonexistence of any deity desiring belief in his existence on the part of humans.

9.4. The Illusion Defense (ID)

ID denies the validity of the inferences and claims made in premise (B) of AL on the basis that reason and science are simply "illusions." No matter what they might seem to reveal about reality, in actuality they reveal nothing; they are deceptive and misleading, the unfortunate product of fallible human minds.

What is one to say about such a theory? For one thing, it is totally groundless. There is no reason whatsoever to believe that either reason or science is an "illusion," or anything analogous thereto. It is no more plausible than, say, subjective idealism: the view that matter is dependent for its existence upon perception (i.e., that things do not exist when they are not perceived by some sentient being, including the being itself). For another, it is totally unfalsifiable, just like UPD, the "invisible-man-on-the-moon" theory, and the hypothesis that there exists an afterlife (as defined above); even if they were merely an "illusion" (which, of course, there is no good reason to believe), how could we possibly discover that? And finally, anyone brave (and foolish) enough to seriously advocate ID would be just as susceptible as advocates of the previous two defenses to the burden of having to account for why God, who desires that humans believe in him, has allowed them to be so untowardly duped by the "sophisticated mask" of reason and science.

Therefore, ID appears irreparably flawed.

10. The Omnipotence Question

Now that all of the defenses against AL (as herein applied) have been refuted, it shall be worthwhile to consider the property of omnipotence as it relates to the argument at hand. As was mentioned earlier (in "Prefatory Comments," above), it is debatable whether or not AL relies for its soundness upon the assumption that God is all-powerful. Throughout the present essay, I have operated under that assumption, partly to avoid confusion but mostly because, as was also stated earlier, the vast majority of theists view God as being (among other things) omnipotent. As the reader has likely already ascertained, the phrase "endowed humans (or permitted them to be endowed)," which I have used repeatedly herein, could not be properly applied to a deity incapable of even preventing that endowment. So the question might be raised: does AL, in fact, presuppose the omnipotence of the deity to which it is applied?

I am inclined to think not. My reason for this is simple: for God to be able to prevent humans from being endowed with the capacity, ability, and predisposition explicated in premise (B) in no way necessarily entails an ability to do everything else that is logically possible, which is, of course, required by omnipotence. It could simply be that God is able to create anything he wishes (and however he wishes) but lacks the ability to perform more difficult and complex actions (whatever they might be). Or perhaps God is not directly responsible for the existence of the universe as presently constituted (and therefore not responsible for humans as presently constituted), but is nonetheless able to modify the nature or condition of anything (or any being) therein. Even that would serve to render AL sound, for if God, who desires that humans believe in him, could have at least prevented them from being endowed with the given capacity, etc. (or could eliminate the capacity, etc. at any time), then the problem of why humans are so endowed remains.

That having been said, AL no doubt requires that God possess a substantial amount of power, whatever degree or amount the aforementioned ability (i.e., the ability to modify anything or any being within the universe) necessitates. It would be impossible, obviously, to determine that degree or amount (even if we were somehow able to quantitatively measure "power," we would have no data regarding the degree or amount needed for the ability in question), but for our purposes it shall suffice to say that if God possesses X amount of power (where X is sufficient for said ability), then AL is sound. And without even ascertaining what X is, it seems reasonable to suppose that virtually all theists believe God to possess it. Thus, AL presents a formidable challenge to virtually all theists.

11. Closing Remarks

As I hope to have shown, AL is a strong evidential argument for the nonexistence of any deity reputed to desire that humans believe in him. Such a deity, of course, is precisely the sort of being posited by most theists. And many such theists ascribe to God a number of properties in addition to that desire, particularly those of possessing foreknowledge and a disposition incompatible with secrecy and remoteness. Although there is no definite or reliable way to calculate the force of a philosophical argument numerically (i.e., by assigning to its conclusion a certain probability, e.g., eighty percent), I would say that, as a very rough measure, for each such additional property that is ascribed to God, the strength of AL increases by five percent. (The reason for that is because each of the properties weakens one or more of the defenses against AL; divine foreknowledge weakens FD and TD, and the type of disposition in question weakens UPD, whose strength I would judge to be roughly equal to that of FD and TD combined.)

Therefore, assuming that AL's conclusion has an initial probability of fifty percent, and that the argument confers upon it a further probability of roughly forty percent, when both of the additional properties described above are included in the concept of God to which it applies, its probability is very close to one hundred percent: virtually a conclusive proof. But, as I said, I think such numerical measurements are misguided in the context of philosophical arguments, so suffice it to say that AL constitutes just what has been claimed: a forceful attack on the world's most popular form of theism. And unless AL can be refuted, that form of theism should be regarded as erroneous.

Notes

[1] According to the 1998 World Almanac, Christians, Jews, and Muslims comprise fifty-three percent of the world's population (roughly three billion people); another seventeen percent (just over a billion people) consists of nontheists. Therefore, at least sixty-three percent of theists are of the sort in question; and because an abundance of theists professing no particular religion view God in a similar way, the figure is probably around eighty or eighty-five percent.

[2] As I shall later explain (in the "Invalid-inferences Defense"), I am not here suggesting that any empirical data indicates the truth of materialism; while that may very well be the case (and materialism may be a correct view), all I mean by this assertion is that although there are possibly some exceptions to the statement "only physical entities exist" (e.g., propositions, mental states, etc.), no such exception is at all comparable to a nonphysical being capable of performing actions and interacting with the universe.

[3] Pascal Bercker, "[God] hell for unbelievers?- a presupposition?," p. 1. Bercker can be reached at bercker@ucsu.Colorado.EDU.

[4] In my book, I assess eight such defenses; the four excluded from the present essay are the "Devil Defense," "Curiosity Defense," "Other-gods Defense," and "Irrationality Defense." I have chosen to halve the number of defenses presented here for two main reasons: first, because of space limitations; and second, because I think the four presented here are by far the most likely to be embraced by theists, as well as the most plausible (relatively speaking). Although some evangelical Christians and other "extreme" believers might propose something like the "Devil Defense" (which hypothesizes basically that Satan, not God, endowed humans with the capacity, ability, and predisposition explicated in AL's premise [B]), I imagine that most would prefer a defense more analagous to TD or UPD. And as for the other three not included here, the "Curiosity Defense" is similar enough to TD that once the latter has been disposed of, so pretty much has the former; and the last two nearly everyone, theists included, would view as so radical as to be almost certainly unacceptable.

[5] It should be noted that the term "free will" normally refers only to actions; however, in the present essay it shall be taken in a sense which encompasses both actions and beliefs, if such a concept is even coherent. I myself am inclined to believe it is not, but for the sake of argument, I shall simply allow that it might be and attack FD without pursuing the issue of belief formation in connection with the will. In other words, rather than criticize the defense in question on the basis that beliefs are in no way subject to the will (an outlook to which I am highly sympathetic), I shall assume that a reasonable case for an opposing theory could be constructed and attack FD on grounds unrelated to what philosophers sometimes call "doxastic involuntarism." What is important to remember here is that even if advocates of FD could somehow prove that humans possess free will with regard to actions (a prospect which seems quite improbable), they would still be faced with the formidable challenge of demonstrating that free will extends to beliefs. Unless they were able to accomplish that, FD would remain untenable, irrespective of the strength of any of the objections thereto.

[6] This definition I respectfully borrow from Theodore M. Drange's Some Essays and Outlines (1998).

[7] The biblical passages herein cited are as they appear in the New International Version of the Bible, and are discussed in Theodore M. Drange's Nonbelief & Evil, p. 134.

[8] Exod. 6:6-7, 7:17, 8:10,22, 9:14,29, 11:7, 14:4,17-18, 16:6,8,12. See also Ps. 77:14, 106:8.

[9] John 9:3-32, 10:37-38, 14:11.

[10] See also Acts 3:6-18, 5:12-16, 9:33-42, 13:7-12, 14:1-11, 28:3-6.

[11] Those who would challenge this statement (i.e., those who believe that there does exist good evidence for God's existence) are urged to read on to the "Optimum-world Objection."

[12] Drange, Nonbelief & Evil: Two Arguments for the Nonexistence of God. (Amherst, N.Y.: Prometheus Books, 1998), pp. 122-123.

[13] Assuming, of course, that the type of deity in question were benevolent. However, even if that deity were less than all-loving, that would in no way necessarily bear on his desire that humans believe in him; a deity could be omnimalevolent and still want people to believe in him. So how God's personality is conceived, though certainly relevant to this particular point, would be immaterial to the objection as a whole (so long as he possesses the given desire).

[14] In 1998 (according to the World Almanac for that year), Christians accounted for approximately thirty-three percent of the world's total population.

[15] John H. Hick, Philosophy of Religion, 4th ed. (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1990), p. 44.

[16] For instance, providing manna from the sky (Exod. 16:11-18,31-35; Num. 11:9; Deut. 8:16), quail by the millions (Num. 11:31-32), water out of a rock (Exod. 17:6; Num. 20:8-11; Deut. 8:15), and leading people as a pillar of cloud by day and as a pillar of fire by night (Exod. 13:21-22; Num. 14:14).

[17] George H. Smith, Atheism, Ayn Rand, and Other Heresies (Buffalo, N.Y.: Prometheus Books, 1991), p. 63.

[18] Ibid., p. 63.

[19] Drange, Nonbelief & Evil: Two Arguments for the Nonexistence of God. (Amherst, N.Y.: Prometheus Books, 1998), p. 88.

[20] Smith, Atheism, Ayn Rand, and Other Heresies (Buffalo, N.Y.: Prometheus Books, 1991), p. 63.

[21] Those who assert that the sentence "God exists" expresses no proposition whatsoever, that it is, in fact, totally meaningless. Most such people subscribe to logical positivism (or some variation thereof), espousing the verifiability theory of meaningfulness.

[22] Drange, Nonbelief & Evil: Two Arguments for the Nonexistence of God. (Amherst, N.Y.: Prometheus Books, 1998), p. 156.

[23] Ibid., p. 157.

[24] Ibid., p. 125. See also pp. 329-349.

[25] Ibid., p. 165.

[26] Ibid., p. 166.

[27] Drange's abbreviation for "The Testing Defense Applied to ANB."

[28] Ibid., p. 166.

[29] See the "Misapplication of Reason and Science Defense [MRSD]."

[30] J.L. Schellenerg, Divine Hiddenness and Human Reason (Ithaca, NY.: Cornell University Press, 1993).

[31] Ibid.

[32] This theory vaguely resembles the hypothesis (decisively refuted by Schellenberg in his book) that God, by remaining hidden from humanity, indirectly brought about the existence of those people who actually exist, and God wanted specifically those people to exist.

[33] Drange, Nonbelief & Evil: Two Arguments for the Nonexistence of God. (Amherst, N.Y.: Prometheus Books, 1998), p. 278.

[34] Ibid., p. 198.

[35] Ibid., p. 215.

[36] Theodore M. Drange remarked thusly in his 1999 Internet debate with Pastor Douglas Wilson; it can be accessed via <URL:http//www.infidels.org/library/modern/theodore_drange>

[37] Drange, Nonbelief & Evil: Two Arguments for the Nonexistence of God. (Amherst, N.Y.: Prometheus Books, 1998), p. 213.

[38] Ibid., p. 206.

[39] Ibid., p. 206-207.

[40] Drange, "Nonbelief vs. Lack of Evidence," pp. 4-5: <URL:http//www.infidels.org/library/modern/theodore_drange/anbvslea.html>

[41] Ibid., p. 5.

[42] Drange, Nonbelief & Evil: Two Arguments for the Nonexistence of God. (Amherst, N.Y.: Prometheus Books, 1998), p. 377.

[43] Ibid., p. 377.

[44] Jacques P. Thiroux, Philosophy: Theory and Practice. (N.Y.: Macmillan Publishing Company, 1985), p. 343.

[45] Quentin Smith, "Two Ways to Prove Atheism," p. 2: <URL:http://www.freethinkers.org/library/modern/quentin_smith/atheism.html>